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by YeGoblynQueenne
1595 days ago
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Don't worry, I won't yell at you :) I'm fine with "invent" actually, despite the implication of agency (I'm used to the terminology "predicate invention" [1]; although maybe I should actually re-examine the motivation behind it). I'm more interested in the representation issue. I had a look at the quoted article on CNNs earlier. I think there is a very fine line between claiming that a CNN's weights represent an algorithm and that its weights can be _interpreted_ as an algorithm. I feel that the article leans too heavily on the interpretation side and doesn't make enough of an effort to show that the CNNs weight really represent an algorithm, rather than having activations in subsequent layers and therefore with a natural ordering. In any case, I would like to understand how a language model can represent an algorithm. _____________ [1] https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-0-3... |
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Yeah, I agree this is an issue. It feels a bit reminiscent of Searle's Waterfall argument, and so I'm inclined to turn to Scott Aaronson's response here [1; Section 6] – basically, how much work is the interpretation itself doing? If you actually tried to use the "algorithm" to do what your interpretation says it should do, how much work would you have to put into that mapping? If the work required amounts to just implementing the algorithm and effectively ignoring the CNN (or waterfall), then the interpretation is what was doing all the work.
IMO the Curve Circuits case passes this test, since they show that you can mechanically take out the learned weights, drop in the weights derived algorithm they reverse engineered, and the model still works about as well.
> In any case, I would like to understand how a language model can represent an algorithm.
Likewise! :)
[1] https://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf