[iskander]

>In an instance where an L2 is compromised, the potential impact is limited to the integrity of data that individual L2 was contributing to the overall platform.

I think distinction is only meaningful as long as L2s remain a niche curiosity while the majority of transaction volume resides on L1. If the L2 plan succeeds and almost all volume passes through an L2 and one of the major L2s has a bug like in this post, then a large fraction of all ETH could end in the hands of hackers.

The ledger would accurately reflect the moment that a bad actor lifted e.g. 5-10% of the ETH supply off an Arbitrum or StarkNet bridge. Technically the L1 is uncompromised but a lot of money would be "redistributed".

[sophrocyne]

Certainly a possibility, but this is one reason I’d be inclined to believe there will be some significant demand for direct L1 transactions, and a diverse set of L2 layers.

[iskander]

Diverse L2 layers sounds like hell.

Where's your ETH?

Evenly sprinkled between StarkNet, zkSync, Arbitrum, and the thirty competitors that will pop up in the next few years.

[sophrocyne]

Are you envisioning homogenous L2s, or those more specialized in nature? I envision the latter, which would mean the number that any individual entity is exposed to would be limited.

But your point does highlight the UX implications of too much fragmentation, and it’s a worthwhile consideration