[lpage]

Anything involving the phrase "better price" is a regulatory sensitivity, so please forgive the specificity of this answer. It's possible but not guaranteed that both the buyer and seller can get a better price for micro and macro reasons. On the micro front, we're a uniform clearing price auction with prices out to the sixth decimal place (NB: this is not sub-penny pricing—we only accept orders with prices in increments of $0.01). That makes it possible for buyers and sellers to split the spread, with auction dynamics dictating the split. Also, Expressive Bidding allows market makers to provide liquidity on a hedged basis, potentially incentivizing them to post more aggressive sizes and prices.

On the macro front, we're focused on finding Pareto (more accurately Kaldor–Hicks) efficient outcomes missed by simpler auction formats. Imagine that a buyer expects to move the market 5bps while executing, and a seller expects the same. If agency issues prevent them from finding each other outside of OneChronos (perhaps they only have 2bps of statistical expectation) and they trade on OneChronos at the bid/mid/offer, the reader can decide if that constitutes getting a better price than other markets or not. Multiunit auctions make market impact/execution risk known pre-trade and reduce uncertainty for counterparties, potentially reducing the cost of liquidity.