[lpage]

Speaking more broadly than capital markets, it can result in more economically efficient outcomes, especially when some economic agents create disproportionately large negative externalities for others.

For OneChronos, we're a uniform price clearing mechanism that will eventually support submarkets, which can enable (among other things) what's effectively a mutual opt-in repeated play game of reputation and the ability to bid based on reputation. So we don't support any form of price discrimination at present, and what we will eventually support has the nuance to it that both parties chose to opt-in (and Expressive Bidding means that they can bid in multiple submarkets simultaneously without exposure risk). This induces a meta-game of sorts — a market for reputation. We're including it as a cleaner and more transparent version of existing behaviors with the efficiency gains to go with it.

[vamega]

I won't pretend to understand all of this. Despite having worked in systematic equities trading group, I don't have a deep understanding of market micro-structure.

I do appreciate your responding to my question.

I find the technology and ideas you're bringing to market incredibly fascinating. I can't wait to see what comes of this!

[lpage]

Thanks! I'll say that a key design goal of ours is to make it so that PMs/asset managers/execution traders running complex books don't have to think about microstructure. Today's markets and the algorithmic trading stacks surrounding them are enormously complex. Smart Markets and multiunit auctions trade external complexity and internal simplicity (the existing double auction world) for external simplicity/usability and internal complexity (the computational challenges of combinatorial auctions).