[throwmeawaysoon]

i'm not an economist or a game theorist so i don't remember the details but this paper talks about how certain market designs lead to untruthful bidding

https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/vickrey.IJEC.pdf

but in the context of second price auctions.

lpage might be alluding to something having to do with their proxy bidder implementation but the above paper actually discusses how proxy bidders themselves lead to untruthful bidding (so maybe lpage is suggesting their implementation is better?).

[lpage]

VCGs got a real-world test in FB's ad market [1], and the results were mixed. VCG is in a class of theoretically interesting but fragile and overly game-theoretic mechanisms. Our mechanism is boring from a mechanism design standpoint—it's a uniform clearing price periodic auction without any cleaver demand reduction or tricks aimed at incentive compatibility. The complexity of what we allow for with the bidding language makes closed-form/theoretical analysis at best difficult and, in cases, impossible. Instead, we focus on giving traders a direct means to express their valuations and mechanism that minimizes information leakage and post-trade regret (situations where a bidder wishes they'd behaved differently given the auction's outcome).

[1] https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alexander-Leo-Hansen/pu...