| >> (2) the homeserver has (!) plaintext access to all traffic on it > hmm, isn't that unavoidable? Not only is it avoidable, it’s not actually true AFAIU. It’s unfortunate (if historically justifiable) that Matrix has a non-E2EE mode, but the thing it brands as E2EE is actually deserving of the name, with messages accessible to clients only and the associated hurdles (you literally can’t get access to message history in encrypted chats from a new client on the same account unless you get one of your old clients to cross-sign, even if the homeserver will help mediate the prompt). Matrix is not free of problems, but it does have federated, multi-party, multi-device, end-to-end encrypted chats with persistent history and forward secrecy. The underlying crypto goes by Megolm[1]. It’s slightly weaker[2] (in particular regarding backward secrecy) than the strictly two-party thing Signal does (however they brand it these days), but nowhere near the point of allowing the homeserver to eavesdrop. [1] https://blog.jabberhead.tk/2019/03/10/a-look-at-matrix-orgs-... [2] https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/me... |
Note that new features apparently come unencrypted, even in otherwise encrypted rooms. For example reacting to messages with emoji sends the reaction non-E2E-encrypted for both all home servers to see: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29656282.