You'd need to download from different identities; if I was them I'd be injecting user, IP, organization, date, and a signed hash thereof (tamper evidence if someone does something like change a digit in the IP)
The signed hash doesn't matter because you only need to de-identify the document, not pass it off as someone else's. If the organization finds a document with all of the identifying information removed, they know that someone fucked with their DRM but they don't know who.
My thought was that if the publisher is trying to hunt people sharing copies, and they have such a copy, it would be useful to be confident that the metadata you embedded is actually accurate; sure, it's obvious if, say, the IP field is zeroed out, but what if they just changed the last octet to 7, and that results in you spending weeks leaning on an ISP to give you the identity of the wrong person? Granted, that's probably more care than Elsevier is likely to take, but the point is that they're passing data through hostile hands, so it'd be sensible to do something for integrity checking.