[monkeyjoe]

Got a reference for this?

My understanding is Nash equilibrium exists in any game with finite states, regardless of perfect or imperfect information.

The bit about announcing your strategy holds by definition - the equilibrium is defined such that no player can improve, thus it doesn't matter if the other player's strategy is known. Also, I don't think there's a requirement that Nash strategies be reachable by iteration.

[hmate9]

Everything you said about Nash equilibrium is true, I didn't mean to imply that it can only be found in perfect information games via iteration.

What I wanted to say is that methods for finding it via iteration and self-play exist and are well defined but only for perfect information games.

The research itself is here: https://ai.facebook.com/blog/rebel-a-general-game-playing-ai...

[monkeyjoe]

Hey just wanted to say thanks for sharing this.

[telxosser]

I believe you could say the minimax strategy to the 2 player game of heads up no limit is solved but beyond that is stretching it.

I am way out of it though. I suspect anything more than 2 players is unsolvable when you factor in the stochastic nature of the drunk guy at the table with more than 2 players. Then based on his play he subtracts or adds EV to us randomly.

I won't even let myself think past this though with poker because IMO it is a waste of time.