[Silhouette]

Another example - if you're keeping personal details on people who have committed fraud (or not) and referencing that years later, then I'd say that falls squarely in the purpose of the GDPR and you should not be doing that long term.

You're saying that we shouldn't be keeping detailed records of previous attempts to criminally defraud us that are demonstrably useful for identifying and preventing further attempts to criminally defraud us over a long period of time by the same groups of people?

I'm sorry to be blunt but that is not a serious proposition. If anyone thinks the GDPR says otherwise, chapter and verse please.

[tremon]

I agree with you that this is a good example of a GDPR challenge. I think that building a profile of user patterns to protect against fraud & abuse is a perfectly legitimate business interest, even under the GDPR. But I disagree that this is a problem unique to the GDPR -- any means of profiling like this runs the risk of discriminating against protected groups or individuals, and there's been plenty of discussion here about e.g. the use of proxy identifiers for race of background employed by universities to filter applicants.

As with all legislation, there is no clear yes or no answer. If a GDPR watchdog were to evaluate your use of this information, they would primarily care whether you (as a company) are aware of the risks involved in the profiling, whether you have spent the effort to weigh the pros and cons of your approach, and whether you have taken steps to sufficiently anonymize such data without making it useless for your purpose. If you have, I don't think you have to worry about retroactive fines even if the watchdog concludes you're violating the GDPR in some way.

Personally, I'd go even further and say that you don't have to honour data deletion requests from users that have tried to defraud you -- it's unlikely they will do so because they would be required to identify themselves to you, after which you can turn them in to the police, but you can legitimately argue that you need to keep their identity on-file to protect your business. I'm sure the GDPR disagrees with me here, but I'd like to see a watchdog test that case in court.

[Silhouette]

I'm sure the GDPR disagrees with me here, but I'd like to see a watchdog test that case in court.

I doubt it. The right to erasure has never been absolute even under GDPR. Typical examples are that you can't compel a bank to delete all records of a loan it gave you, nor compel the police to delete a criminal record of your past behaviour, as long as the data is lawfully and properly handled.

[mindslight]

Is that what you are specifically doing and describing above, or are you just choosing one implication of my general pondering?

If this is actually what you're doing, let's discuss the specific details of the information flow you're using to make these decisions, rather than talking in terms of strong sweeping generalizations. If you're just picking out a worst case implication of my general statement, that doesn't seem very productive. An example of what I was specifically thinking:

Customer buys something from Vendor. Customer never receives package. Vendor refuses to issue refund because tracking marks delivered. Customer files CC chargeback (I know this is less common in the EU but work with me here).

From the perspective of the Vendor this Customer has defrauded them, or at the very least is an increased risk. From the perspective of the Customer, they've been unjustly judged for circumstances beyond their control.

Can the Vendor retain that judgement on the Customer forever? Can they share it with other Vendors to create an industry blacklist of "problematic" customers? These questions seem squarely within the aim of the GDPR.

[Silhouette]

In the example I was thinking of the situation was much more clear-cut than that. Again I'm not going to get into real specifics because this is legal stuff and it's just a discussion forum, but consider this broadly similar example.

You provide a service that anyone can sign up for. It costs money.

As a matter of good customer service your usual practice is to allow significant grace periods when money owed is overdue before you actually cut a customer off.

Someone signs up for a real account using the name "Mallory One" and then exploits the "generosity" of your system to avoid paying part of what they owe you. Eventually you cut them off.

Someone then signs up for a real account using the name "Mallory Two" and does the same thing again. Again you eventually cut them off but miss part of the payment you were due.

After this has happened several times over an extended period, it comes to your attention that the only people signing up using names of the form "Mallory (number)" are ripping you off and the person or persons responsible have already cost you thousands in unpaid bills.

You add a rule to your security system that says when anyone creates an account with the name "Mallory (number)" you will immediately block it.

How long are you allowed to remember the pattern "Mallory (name)" in your security system if it can potentially be tied to a specific individual and is therefore personal data but you reasonably believe that person to be responsible for all of that fraud and you reasonably expect that they will continue to defraud you if you don't prevent it?

[mindslight]

Is this is a practical way of preventing fraud? Can the person not switch their next account from "Mallory Three" to "Eve Smith", thereby evading your rule?

I understand you've simplified the example here for the sake of discussion, but I think the details inform the situation. Like if you really just want to discriminate on any account named "Mallory _____" then that doesn't seem like personal data to me (even though you've created the rule from "personal data"), but also it doesn't seem particularly effective so there must be more to the story.

For an analogous example, you don't need to keep a permanent record of fraudulent transactions with specific IP addresses of 10.0.37.{23,45,67} to remember that 10.0.37/24 is suspicious.

(Also what about everybody else who legitimately has the first name Mallory ?)

Your case is interesting because it contains a few unusual qualities that businesses generally don't offer, but smaller "nicer" businesses will give more leeway. You could straightforwardly stop giving a large freebie to new users or require a payment method or identification on signup, but it would be nice to figure out where the line is instead of just giving in to such less friendly practices.

[Silhouette]

I'm sorry that it's difficult to discuss these issues reasonably based only on simplified analogies. Again, these are real issues with potentially real police or courts involved if it got serious enough, so there is only so far it's sensible for me to go with any examples.

Yes, the situation absolutely was a practical way of preventing fraud. It saved us a significant amount of money with no apparent downside except for a little time to implement the security measures and the slight GDPR concern we've been discussing. The pattern we were looking for in that case wasn't quite as simple as the name example, but perhaps you'll take my word that it really was almost as obvious but it did also have personal data/identification implications. As I wrote in another comment, it's amazing how dumb people are sometimes but even dumb people can still cause damage. I have a few other examples in mind where similar principles apply and those have also prevented material damage to the business and/or other customers.

Just to explain one detail that might look implausible, the grace period being exploited wasn't for new customers, who do have to pay up front. It was for existing customers who pay late (or, as it turns out, sometimes not at all) when further payments are due. Ironically part of the reason we allow that period beyond wanting excellent customer service is for GDPR compliance. We have an obligation to protect any personal data we hold properly and there is at least a plausible argument that deleting everything the moment an account goes overdue on a bill would not meet the standard.

As you have perhaps guessed, this is a smaller business and we do try to be a "nicer" one. Most of the time I think that is a good thing. However it does mean we don't have dedicated staff or budget for any issues like this. When someone on the far side of the world is trying to rip us off, one of us doesn't get to sleep that night until we've fixed the problem, if we can. Every time we have to spend time and money on compliance changes or taking professional advice and every time the business loses money to fraud, that has rather direct consequences for the personal finances of the people who are doing the work to run the business. We do take security and privacy seriously and we try extremely hard to stay on the right side of any relevant rules (far more than most professionals we talk to expect for a business of our size, and I'm told far more than a lot of much larger businesses with dedicated staff for this stuff).

But it really does boil my blood when people say things like GDPR compliance is easy unless you're doing dodgy things or they assume that because I don't agree it means we haven't thought about it or run a business professionally. If the issues were so simple and obvious, there wouldn't be 16 comments under my original one as I write this without a single citation of either the GDPR or any regulatory or court authority to back up any of the answers given or claims made.

[mindslight]

Reading between the lines it seems that you're hesitant to share any details because your method would be easy to work around if you did.

However I am still trying to understand your specific difficulty with the GDPR, because I am one of those people who will blindly assert that it should be relatively easy as long as you've built your systems to be legible to user requests (which I will admit is a bit naive). I really am interested in specific cases where this is not true, and furthermore where it's impossible to change data storage to make it true.

Trying to think about this abstractly just leads me to scenarios where it's not a problem. For example if a customer owes you money, then I would think you have a legitimate business reason to hang onto their personal information for as long as it takes to collect their debt. It's kind of hard to argue that a business has no legitimate reason to remember you if you still haven't paid them. Have you been advised to the contrary, xor does this not apply to your situation?