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by zokier
1628 days ago
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Everything was unencrypted until late 90s (and in many cases until late 00s). Email (both smtp and pop3/imap), irc, web, gopher, telnet, ftp, local disks, removable storage, network storage (smb/nfs etc), everything. Computing and the internet was much nicer place, there wasn't such an adversial attitude where everything would be broken just because its out there like today. |
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It wasn't nicer back then, it was lazy and naïve.
3DES was widespread in the payment card industry, but the attitude towards protecting any/all parts of networks corresponding to the 7-layer OSI model was generally lax.
IPv4 public address ranges (mostly registered Class B's and C's) were wasted frivolously for internal corporate networks where they weren't suited or even necessary.
Unless they didn't know what they were doing, bank logins weren't unencrypted. Ever.
I and some lab peeps played with ARP and IP spoofing to steal each other's telnet sessions in the late 90's. It was obvious telnet, rcp, rsh, echo, char, finger, and nfs needed major reworking and/or abandonment.
Later, the Equifax hack broke SSN's as universal American private "UUIDs" (primary keys).
Things still broken as of 2022:
0. Without deploying 802.11x, DHCP by itself is still terrible because anyone spoof being a server and disrupt many communications on a LAN. Properly managed campus ELANs/WLANs should authenticate all WiFi and Ethernet connections equally and disconnect any misbehaviors at the port or AP-association level.
1. PII should be held by a secure, independent, nongovernmental nonprofit where it can be updated in one place and set access policies by the individual. Companies then can request access to it. That way, PII is treated more like medical records (PHI) and payment card info. For the most part, corporate customer data should be anonymized as much as possible by law.
2. There is no global universal standard identity / proximity card / secret keys HSM. Similarly, it should not be held or managed by any country, only issued by their organizations.
3. There is simultaneously too much anonymity for launching cyberattacks while not enough for protecting dissidents. Social media app operators should understand how much anonymity and identity-revealing/-proving is appropriate to ensure people invest-in and maintain a minimum amount of decency and empathy vs. cyberdisinhibitionism.