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by Jiro
1635 days ago
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>This line of reasoning only makes sense if you think that moral positions have no qualities other than how strongly people hold them. Of course there are differences in moral positions other than how strongly people hold them. But if you're going to make a rule about them, your rule can't take those differences into account, because everyone thinks their own moral position is correct. It's like having a rule "the police may coerce confessions from suspects, but only if they're guilty". This rule is impossible in practice because every officer coercing a confession thinks the suspect is guilty. |
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No, that’s precisely what I’m disagreeing with. The point is that it is possible to think your position is correct, and your opponent thinks their position is correct, but you are correct and they are incorrect. Why can’t a “rule” take that into account? Any notion of justice clearly has to take this into account already!