[quitit]

Generating a encrypted voucher based on a known CSAM image is not spying anymore than the device cataloguing images by descriptions.

For a technical forum the lack of willingness of individuals to read into the system is perplexing. So far most of the arguments I've read are entirely based on creating a strawman then beating that to death.

[BostonEnginerd]

Is there anything which prevents non-CSAM images from being added into this catalogue? As I understand it, the only thing stopping that is a promise from Apple - which can be steamrolled by a government request.

[ziddoap]

>For a technical forum the lack of willingness of individuals to read into the system is perplexing.

Admittedly, I may have missed it... But can you point out to me where this system cannot be expanded to non-CSAM material?

As a totally wild example, is this technology restricted, in some technical manner, from scanning for images which display a certain political leader as Winnie the Pooh?

[MrQuincle]

What can happen:

+ Approximate matching. They might want to have images almost similar also to be flagged. + Scope creep. Particular images of people who are wanted or areas where they might live or shots of joints etc. + Mistakes. Accidentally flagging honest citizens and the bureaucracy that will follow. "Innocent until proven guilty..." That's not preemptively scanning someone's personal devices.