[dotBen]

C'mon Zed, really?

a) The code will be open source - the community can verify the code for anything untoward

b) Given the nature of the product, most implementations are going to be behind a firewall anyway, with the storage layer talking to business logic. Even if there was a backdoor, and I'm sure there isn't, not sure how NSA could get in.

Do you think there's a backdoor in NSA's open-source algorithm for SHA-1 too?

I applaud the government for putting tax dollars back into open source. My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess). I generally like to know what I'm helping commit code to go do - although granted you have no idea what other open source projects are used for regardless of whether the lead sponsor is government or private company.

[seabee]

If there are plenty of good uses for the code, I'd still want to improve it, even if I find out it's used by the Kitten Krusher 3000.

Unless a "please don't use this code for evil" license is legally binding, that's just the nature of open source.

[MrMorden]

A "please don't use this code for evil" license would, by definition, not be open-source. (Also, such a license would almost certainly be ignored by evildoers.)

[pipeline_tux]

I don't necessarily think there will be one, but I wouldn't be surprised either.

Security flaws can be extremely subtle and 200,000 lines of code is a lot to review... Given that there's plausible deniability (we didn't do it intentionally, it was a genuine bug!), if you were them, wouldn't it at least cross your mind to try it?

Also, at some point, if it becomes popular, some sysadmin at a large foreign government agency or company will forget to firewall off a box running it (ignoring that they could also be connecting back directly - automatic updates anyone?)

[dmoney]

But if there is a back door, doesn't releasing it as open source open the possibility that China's or Iran's equivalent of the NSA will audit the code and find it too?

[zedshaw]

That's why they should stop doing that. We aren't the smartest country on the planet anymore.

[pipeline_tux]

In which case the NSA say "Oops, it was a genuine mistake. Sorry." With 200,000 lines of code, there will almost certainly be unintentional security holes that haven't been found.

[taftster]

"My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess)."

It's likely just used exactly how you think it would be; to hold massive amounts of key/value data. No doubt, the NSA likely has tons of data to work with. A NoSQL approach would be seemingly beneficial for this use case.

[adnam]

I think it was just a joke, chill :)

[zedshaw]

A joke?! A JOKE?! You jest good sir. I merely put on my tinfoil hat and thought, "Hmmm, didn't this happen to OpenBSD, Windows, every crypto system ever, numerous databases, and probably SELinux?" Then extrapolated out to a very valid point.

How dare you claim I am not deadly serious about the NSA putting a back door in a database that is intended to be secure for the internet. How. Dare. You!

[marshray]

I still can't tell if you're joking.

I've seen a possible back door or two in this or that, but nothing like "every crypto system ever".

If you have evidence of a back door in AES, SHA-2, or anything NIST has standardized (other than Dual_EC_DRBG or openly weakened stuff like export SSL) lots of people would like to hear about it.

[william42]

Didn't the NSA actually make DES stronger?

[marshray]

Yes, the story goes that the NSA assisted IBM in its development by tuning the specific values in the S-boxes to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis, which had not yet been publicly discovered.

They also reduced the key length from 64 to 56 bits. I found this suspicious and didn't accept the explanation that those 8 bits were needed for "parity". Yet, respected cryptographers say this actually brings the key size more in line with the effective strength. So those additional 8 bits in the key were not contributing to the security and it improves the "truth in labeling".

Why would they build weaknesses into standard blocks, the biggest consumer of which is the US government itself?

When the NSA had at times insisted on an upper limit for a protocol's security (e.g., export crypto), they usually would require a simple upper limit on the number of secret bits in the key. When they've submitted fixes they tend to be elegant and minimal (e.g. SHA-0 to SHA-1).

[marchdown]

Can you elaborate on the "openly weakened stuff" part?

I don't know much about security, but I am vaguely aware that there were some efforts by various governments to control, regulate, weaponize and even outlaw crypto, but I don't know where these effort have left us. Are there any crypto systems with acknowledged backdoors? Are there any which are not only widely considered to be secure, but are known to have actually prevented three-letter agencies from getting their way?

[oomkiller]

Back in the 90s the US Government prohibited export of SSL stronger than 40 bits. I believe this is what they're referring to.