[AnthonyMouse]

> This is because the current status quo for encryption is to use TLS based on certificate authorities.

Not everything has to be TLS or even HTTP. Look at messaging apps. Signal is encrypted, but the end-to-end encryption it uses isn't TLS and doesn't use certificate authorities.

> If Lets Encrypt ever goes corrupt like dot Org did it would cause an incredible amount of trouble and that entity would have power over a large portion of the web, if not the entire internet.

Not really. Let's Encrypt doesn't have a monopoly over anything. They use an open protocol (ACME) that any other CA could implement. If they went evil, someone else would implement the same protocol and everybody would switch to them. Which also implies that they won't, because why bother if that's what will happen?

This is kind of a problem with the CA system the other way -- if you have one bad CA they can sign any domain even if they shouldn't -- but in this case it prevents what you're worried about.

[judge2020]

> if you have one bad CA they can sign any domain even if they shouldn't -- but in this case it prevents what you're worried about.

This is why certificate transparency is a thing and most browsers require it for public internet domains[0,1].

0: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/refs/heads/...

1: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205280

[judge2020]

> that any other CA could implement.

For reference, many CAs (even paid ones) have implemented it:

Digicert https://docs.digicert.com/certificate-tools/Certificate-life...

Sectigo (formerly Comodo) https://sectigo.com/resource-library/sectigo-adds-acme-proto...

[immibis]

I'm surprised if Signal doesn't use TLS, considering that Android tries to force apps to always use TLS, which is because of the point the parent comment is making.