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by tptacek
1666 days ago
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It's worth noting that this by itself is a reason not to do ambitious security things (and a global PKI is nothing if not ambitious) at the layer of DNS. It's an extension of the end-to-end argument, or at least of the the logic used in the Saltzer and Reed paper: because it's difficult and error-prone to deploy policy code in the core of the network (here: the "conceptual" core of the protocol stack), we should work to get that policy further up the stack and closer to the applications that actually care about that policy. The Saltzer and Reed paper, if I'm remembering right, even calls out security as specifically one of those things you don't want to be doing in the middle of the network. See also: Zero Trust / BeyondCorp. |
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There has been many that has suggested that we should just scrap the whole thing called The Internet and start from scratch. It would be safer, but I don't think it is a serious alternative. DNS, BGP, IP, UDP, TCP, and HTTP to name a few are seeing incremental changes, and the cost is preferable over the alternative of doing nothing. Ambitious security things would be much less costly if we had working redundancy in place, which is one of those things that flag day tend to illustrate. Good redundancy and people won't notice when HTTP becomes HTTP/2 that later becomes HTTP/3. It also helped development at google that when they added QUIC, they controlled both ends of the connection.