[zocoi]

You didn’t answer the parent post. Your point was, in game theory, there’s no benefit in attacking the network or the loss is huge that it doesn’t worth the the attack. The parent post gave the counter point that there could be a benefit which we haven’t thought. If Dr Evil is heavily invested in 2 network, he might destroy one to focus on the remaining. The chance of the attack is low but it is not zero

[cs702]

I addressed it in the first paragraph of my comment above. Let me quote from it here: The theoretical attack argument is indeed "applicable, not just to Algorand and other block chains, but also, more generally, to ANY transaction platform" -- VISA, Mastercard, Amex, ACH, Fedwire, etc. No one disagrees that it is applicable, i.e., a theoretical threat, to all transaction platforms.

Now, if you think such an attack is an important problem for block chains, then you must also think it is an important problem for all legacy transaction networks. Yet we're all comfortable using our credit cards and bank accounts every day, and for virtually all practical purposes, we don't worry about a "Doctor Evil scenario." Why should we think and behave differently for block chain networks?

Moreover, as I wrote before, in practice, legacy transaction networks (like, say, regional VISA networks run by 100-year-old banks) are easier and cheaper to attack. If the Doctor Evil scenario were a real threat, it would be more profitable for him to target one of the legacy networks!

[md_]

I like this point, but (as I think you are saying as well) it’s true for POW as well, right?

Fundamentally, if there are off-chain incentives to destroy the value of a given blockchain, much of our reasoning about the game theory doesn’t hold up.

[satronaut]

he's a POS shill, there's no point arguing with these kinds of people. Proof of work will outlast all consensus protocols