[evancoop]

Perhaps there is some definition of freedom in mathematical terms in which the total scope of decision-making autonomy is maximized over all citizens? The barbarian example would yield a low tally, as the leaders of a hoard are "free," but their subordinates have little decision-making capacity. In terms of the limitations of personal freedoms, the boundary might lie where the diminishment of others' freedoms exceeds the diminishment of one's own if restrained. (E.g. killing someone eliminates all of their future decisions, but preventing a murder eliminates only one decision for the potential murderer?)

[thegrimmest]

It somewhat boils down to violence, doesn't it?

1) Your degree of freedom is strictly a relationship between you and those who are able to legitimately use violence against you. Legitimate here meaning you have no means of recourse besides violence of your own.

2) How free you are is then expressed as a graph of all possible actions you may take which are not prohibited by the threat of legitimate violence (often expressed as "law").

3) Then a "free and equal society" is one the total size of the graph is optimized for. This mandates laws which delegitimize violence except where strictly necessary to enforce said delegitimization.

4) The only addition that is typically made in large, agrarian societies is the legitimization of the private ownership and transfer of property. Thus we have "free, equal and orderly" societies.

These lead us to the usual functions of the military (to protect from external violence), the police (to protect from domestic violence), and the courts (to resolve disputes, usually over property, which would otherwise turn violent). From there, any encroachment of the state (such as mandating participation in various insurance schemes) into the graph of its citizens would be strictly perceived as a curtailing of freedom.

It's important to note that these terms necessarily exclude material circumstance from their definition. They also define violence in the strict sense of physical force. You are not less free because you may be sick or poor, since these are not interactions with people who may use legitimate violence.

[handrous]

> 1) Your degree of freedom is strictly a relationship between you and those who are able to legitimately use violence against you. Legitimate here meaning you have no means of recourse besides violence of your own.

I strongly disagree with this. "Strictly?" Oh my, no. There's so much more that goes into one's practical ability to exercise freedom. It's why a rich person—even if they were treated identically by the state—is far freer than a poor person. It's why removing hypothetical but mostly useless freedoms (say, the "freedom" to choose my health insurer) can in some cases truly increase how free I actually am (no longer have to spend all that time screwing around with health insurers; no longer as dependent on employment for healthcare, et c).

[thegrimmest]

Well, then we clearly just disagree on what the definition of "freedom" is. Mine is aligned basically with the idea as it was first laid down during the French revolution. From the Declaration of the Rights of Man:

> Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights

One of us should in good faith acquiesce from the term, to avoid overloading it, no? I propose that the existing definition remain, and the practical ability to do stuff be given a new one, say "capability". In other words, the incapable are just as free as the capable.

[handrous]

If your definition calls the pauper in a society with no rules whatsoever freer than the billionaire in a society with exactly one government-enforced rule, which prohibits unsolicited sales calls after 6:00 PM on Sundays, then it's a broken definition.

[thegrimmest]

Whether it's broken or not is up to you, but that's what freedom means. All I'm suggesting is that people acknowledge that they are indeed attempting curtail our freedoms (ie. enslave us) even to a minutely limited degree, in order to accomplish their vision of good.

This moves the conversation forward, because the next question is how do we know your vision of good is the right one, worthy of the requisite sacrifice of our liberty? Is it really worthwhile to enslave the competent and the fortunate in order to maintain the incapable and unfortunate?

[handrous]

> Whether it's broken or not is up to you, but that's what freedom means.

You are not the arbiter of this, however much you insist on it, and all four relevant definitions in Webster's 1913—a great source if you're looking for conservative and time-tested definitions of US English usage—disagree with you, if we're really going to quibble over that. "Liberty" is, as in your quoted translation from the French, much closer, but you are still insisting on a much narrower interpretation than is common. You're also reading your source as an exclusive definition, when it doesn't, per se, claim anything of the sort. You're using it in a jargony sense from a particular political philosophy—the promoters of which find their job much easier when they get to define words in particular, not-quite-normal ways, then use those convenient definitions as a sandy foundation for various shaky logical towers—which does not mean the general definition must conform to yours.

> This moves the conversation forward, because the next question is how do we know your vision of good is the right one, worthy of the requisite sacrifice to our liberty? Is it really worthwhile to enslave the competent and the fortunate in order to maintain the incapable and unfortunate?

It's tough and messy and absolutely ends up being largely arbitrary, because moral and political philosophy aren't math and never will be. We don't "know". We can't. Trying to "know" will quickly send you into "not even wrong" territory.

> (ie. enslave us)

> Is it really worthwhile to enslave the competent and the fortunate in order to maintain the incapable and unfortunate?

LOL, OK. I've glanced at your post history. This ain't going anywhere productive. Hope you find your way out of this some day. Doesn't look like any previous posters have done any good no matter how gentle (or harsh) they've been, so I'll leave off there.

[nybble41]

This is a good definition. It is very close to my own, though I would quibble about endorsing the propaganda term "legitimate". Certainly those who practice such violence want it treated as legitimate, and your phrase "no means of recourse besides violence of your own" gets to the core of the issue: that others allow them to get away with calling it legitimate, without offering resistance. However, these factors are not sufficient to justify violence when it is neither defensive nor proportional and reciprocal.

Also, you relegate "private ownership and transfer of property" to a minor and seemingly optional footnote while this is a necessary aspect of the definition of "violence". (Is theft not violence? If your answer is "no", how about starving someone by stealing all their food, or the land and capital equipment they need to grow it? Or the barter goods or money they needed to purchase it? Etc., etc.)

The problems with "the usual functions" (and the key difference between minarchists and anarchists such as myself) are: (a) These things can be, and have been at various times, provided privately without initiating violence, so it is not necessary to curtail freedom for them. (b) It's not enough to say "a military is necessary to reduce violence, and this falls under the heading of 'military', and thus is allowed". To justify it on the basis of minimizing overall violence this military must never employ more violence than necessary, or more than it demonstrably curtails elsewhere, including in its funding process or in enforcing any rules it imposes. The same goes for the police and the courts. The courts have the easiest path; they're not that far removed from private arbitration. The military is the hardest to justify, particularly a standing army in a country like the U.S. with only two neighbors sharing land borders or even on the same continent—both of whom are considered allies.

[kag0]

That's an interesting way to look at it, but I take an issue here

> How free you are is then expressed as a graph of all possible actions you may take which are not prohibited by the threat of legitimate violence

It's a good point to think in terms of possible actions you may take. But violence isn't the only thing that can prune that graph.

Say I come across an orchard surrounded by an [unclimbable] fence. I want to eat some fruit in the orchard, but cannot because of the fence. There is no violence I face that prevents my action, and no violence I can level to take the action. Yet my action is prohibited by another, and thus my freedom limited.

[thegrimmest]

That's exactly my point though. The only pruning of the graph which counts against your freedom is that which is done with the threat of legitimate violence. You are still free in spite of the fact that you cannot access said orchard. It's simply beyond your capabilities, much like you are still free despite lacking wings to fly over the barrier.

Who erected the barrier is not relevant here. What if the barrier was a circumstance of nature? An orchard on a plateau surrounded by unclimbable cliffs?

[mcguire]

"The idea of freedom is inspiring. But what does it mean? If you are free in a political sense but have no food, what's that? The freedom to starve?" -- Angela Y. Davis

[thegrimmest]

"We, too, born to freedom, and believing in freedom, are willing to fight to maintain freedom. We, and all others who believe as deeply as we do, would rather die on our feet than live on our knees."

- Franklin Delano Roosevelt

[kag0]

I would say that the only pruning of the graph which matters is that which is done by your fellows.

An orchard atop a cliff presents an equal challenge to all. Some might have the ability and desire to scale it, some not.

What is the difference between a fence around an orchard and a threat of insurmountable violence if you enter the orchard? Either way it is someone else restricting your freedom, while they retain that same freedom for themselves.

[mcguire]

This is, to my mind, a very libertarian stance, and I think it demonstrates the fundamental sketchiness of libertarianism.

The three major questions are, what do you mean by "violence" (which you have answered), and what do you mean by "legitimate", and what do you mean by "freedom"?

What if, say, your employer in cooperation with others were to blackball you so that the only employment you could get were as an unskilled laborer? That clearly wouldn't be violence. Would it restrict your freedom? Apparently not?

How about if a group of people arrange to ensure that you can only live in a certain area, purely by economic means? No violence, right? Legitimate? Are you less free? No?

Suppose you live in a society that makes collective decisions by voting. But, you are not allowed to participate in those votes, by virtue of material circumstance, say. Still no violence. Still no less free, right?

What about violence? Can I burn down your house if you don't do what I want? If I make sure no one is injured? Material circumstances are excluded, right?

Now, what makes violence legitimate versus illegitimate? If a group of people kill one of your neighbors for violating some extra-legal rule, that would clearly be a crime, right? But what if the people doing it cannot be identified? Or, if identified, arrested, and prosecuted, they are found to be not guilty. Repeatedly. Clearly, you would feel some pressure to follow said rule although that would not be a restriction on your freedom, right?

Is chattel slavery an imposition on the freedom of the slave, if physical violence is not used?

I suggest that your definition of "freedom" is very far off from the normal, colloquial definition ("the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint" according to the Goog')---there are plenty of restraints on your power to act and speak that do not involve violence. (Thinking? We're working on that.)

You mention insurance schemes, which is always a fun topic because I'm old and can remember when requiring liability insurance for drivers was controversial. Is it legitimate for anyone, especially the state, to force you to be financially responsible for your actions? Would that be a restriction on your freedom? Absolutely! Would it be a legitimate (oooh, there's that word) restriction?

[thegrimmest]

Many of your examples are variants on the same point: the cooperation of others. I contend that no you are not owed the cooperation of your employer, or other members of society, for absolutely anything. Interactions between free people should be strictly voluntary and consensual. This means if your employer wishes to cease employing you, he should be able to do so at his leisure. If he's breached a contract, you can sue for damages.

So yes, if your entire town decides to blackball you, that is an exercise of their freedom. If people decide not to sell you their property, that is likewise their choice. You are just as free as you have always been, no one is using force against you. They are simply refusing to cooperate with you.

In what world does forcing a person to employ another not an impingement of their freedom? Anyone who can use the threat of violence to compel participation is a master, and free people have no masters.

> Suppose you live in a society that makes collective decisions by voting

As long as these decisions cannot be enforced with physical violence then you are no less free by being excluded. Say I run a supper club which votes on where to eat next, are you less free by not being invited?

> If a group of people kill one of your neighbors for violating some extra-legal rule...

This entire paragraph describes corruption, which is inevitable, and does impact your freedom. No human process is immune.

> Is chattel slavery an imposition on the freedom of the slave, if physical violence is not used?

Chattel slavery is defined by the use of violence to confine the slave literally in chains. If the slave can just leave he's not very enslaved is he?

> there are plenty of restraints on your power to act and speak that do not involve violence

Most of these take the form of the threat of withholding cooperation. This is a perfectly legitimate threat to make in a free society, and one I contend has no bearing on your liberty. Living in a free society is merely agreeing to coexist peacefully, not that everyone must cooperate, or be the same team, or be immune from the consequences of failure. In fact, my reading of the article is that it means exactly the opposite - that people are free to cooperate or not as they see fit.

[mcguire]

Actually, all of my examples are (variants in some cases) of the means used to restrict the freedom of groups of people in the recent history of the United States. Not to "cooperate, or be the same team, or be immune from the consequences of failure" but to actually restrict that group's ability to act or speak.

I notice that you ignored the common definition of freedom I quoted. I find your definition of freedom...less than useful. It ignores any other sources of power than "the state" (I wonder how you would deal with the absence of a state.) It leads to irrational consequences; an individual can be perfectly free and yet unable to do anything except starve.

I do have a couple of questions about your response, though.

"> If a group of people kill one of your neighbors for violating some extra-legal rule...

"This entire paragraph describes corruption, which is inevitable, and does impact your freedom. No human process is immune."

Corruption, in this case, does not imply any violence at all---a jury is free to return a verdict of not guilty for any reason, no? How can that possibly impact your freedom?

"Chattel slavery is defined by the use of violence to confine the slave literally in chains. If the slave can just leave he's not very enslaved is he?"

(It's not really defined by violence, but I'll leave that up to you.) My plantation is located in the middle of the desert. You are free to leave at any time. You won't, because you would die, but you are free to do so. So you're really free, right?

[beaconstudios]

there is sort-of, it's called utilitarianism. However, maths isn't a magical cure-all - the ethical dilemma is just shifted onto how you quantise your ethical problems.

[ComodoHacker]

Looking from a dialectic perspective, the higher in the social hierarchy you are, the more freedom you have in some of your decisions and less in others. Decisions like where to live, what to wear, who to befriend etc., become more free and at the same time less yours. Taking it to the extreme, is a leader of an authoritarian state free to stop oppressing their people and install democracy? Is a leader of a democratic state free to start oppressing their people and install authoritarianism?

Perhaps the grand theorem of freedom would state that freedom in the Universe is constant.

[photochemsyn]

We could examine this by comparing 'anti-freedom' systems like chattel slavery (Old US South Cotton Plantations) vs. wage slavery (Appalachian Coal Company Towns).

In the former, refusal to work for the masters led to beatings, torture, mutilitaion and death. In the later, refusal to work for the bosses led to homelessness and hunger and death.

Now, one could argue that the coal company town was 'more free' than the cotton plantation, I suppose.

Ultimately freedom requires the dismantling and weakening of hierarchical social power structures. Let's say the people in that coal company town were the ones who elected their bosses, rather than some remote collection of wealthy shareholders.

Wouldn't that be even more free? Democratization of corporations seems like going in the direction of freedom. Germany is ahead in this, as corporate boards in Germany include employee representatives, not just shareholder representatives.

[thegrimmest]

> Now, one could argue that the coal company town was 'more free' than the cotton plantation, I suppose.

Yes! Crucially because its residents were free to leave. Doing something unpleasant or dangerous due to economic necessity is vastly different than doing it in chains.

You're assuming the Appalachian coal company residents had no other options when clearly they did, as evidenced by the patterns of migration to and from these towns. Working in a coal mine was just their preferred choice, given the alternatives available. Many of these men took pride in their work.

[photochemsyn]

I agree, but also that they'd be more free if all the coal workers in a given corporation had the same number of representative voting seats on the corporate board as the shareholders did.

Freedom is a direction, it's a good quote.