[cat199]

Some standards are good, some standards are bad.

OpenBSD chooses to have an opinion on standards according to the project's own security criteria - simple inclusion/exclusion of a given technology X while ignoring their decision process is not a valid reason to critique the security posture of the project as a whole.

[willis936]

I fail to see how secure boot is worse than nothing. I don't need to even begin to think about supply chain attacks when the hardware in my house doesn't have trust between its components.

[nix23]

Talking about supply chain attacks and don't see the irony in promoting secure-boot and tpm need's some hard mind-twisting.

[willis936]

Read it again. I'm saying your concern of supply chain attacks on secure-boot and TPM are like worrying about the ash on your shirt while your house burns down. It's far easier to pwn a system with pre-boot injections on a system without signatures than one with them. Don't like where the signatures come from? Fine. That doesn't make the system have some mysterious backdoor or do whatever sensational magic someone told you it does.

[nix23]

>That doesn't make the system have some mysterious backdoor or do whatever sensational magic someone told you it does.

Can you proof that in the first place?