That's probably an interesting lesson in its own right: PAKE originated in the early 90s and if it's still facing adoption barriers that suggests that the model is fundamentally untenable.
An English captain ran a private experiment in 1601 to see what happened when sailors were fed lemon juice. The group receiving lemon juice had zero cases of scurvy. The group not receiving lemon juice experienced 40% mortality from scurvy.
(Imagine running an experiment today with 40% mortality in the control group!)
The results were reported, but nothing was done with them. The navy had to rediscover the same fact a few hundred years later.
Deploying the scientific method to decide something looks quite obvious to us in these days of Bill Gate's efforts to inject minute sensors into us all under the guise of vaccination or something 8)
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-37320399 - this is a BBC article about James Lind, who did an experiment in 1747. Not too sure about four ships in 1601 - there are no sources in the link above. Also, he was a Scot, not English. He was of course a Brit too (1707-)
The results probably were reported but they were probably not distributed effectively. Nowadays we have the internet to vilify entire populations, within seconds. Back then, you had to get a pamphlet printed that a few 100 people would read.
"Sailors who ate the ship's rats were inadvertently protecting themselves - as the animal synthesizes its own vitamin C."
So there you go. If you run out of shipmates and lemons: eat the rats!
The unintentional part was that he had an experimental group and a control group. The experiment itself was not unintentional; he was already aware that the lemon juice should prevent scurvy. That's why the one ship of four that got the lemon juice was the ship he was on.
The fact that the British navy still had no institutional knowledge of scurvy hundreds of years later is the point I'm making. They didn't know how to deal with it despite the fact that a cure had been known for several thousand years, and the navy itself had received James Lancaster's report over a hundred years prior. The navy's behavior reflects nothing other than a very severe failure that would have been trivial to fix at any time.
The adoption barriers that caused the navy to kill thousands upon thousands of its own men over a period of centuries did not reflect any difficulty in preventing scurvy. It was always easy. They reflected the fact that adoption barriers are very large no matter what the context is, and absolutely overwhelming evidence, such as a 100% reduction in the incidence of a disease that ordinarily kills 40% of your manpower, is not enough to bypass them.
The adoption of a practice is at most tenuously related to the effectiveness of a practice. That is not how people adjust their behavior.
An English captain ran a private experiment in 1601 to see what happened when sailors were fed lemon juice. The group receiving lemon juice had zero cases of scurvy. The group not receiving lemon juice experienced 40% mortality from scurvy.
(Imagine running an experiment today with 40% mortality in the control group!)
The results were reported, but nothing was done with them. The navy had to rediscover the same fact a few hundred years later.
But there was nothing wrong with the model.