[grishka]

Google phones allow re-locking the bootloader with your own key, except it still results in a warning during boot, and there's no way you're passing SafetyNet with this, at least not without hacks like Magisk. Also even when you unlock the bootloader, the TrustZone OS, which runs with hypervisor permissions and manages all the exciting things like DRM and SafetyNet itself, is still off limits for you.

[sangnoir]

> Google phones allow re-locking the bootloader with your own key, except it still results in a warning during boot

The warning is a great thing for security: I'd appreciate it if my phone showed me that warning after I've surrendered it to the border control agent (alternatively, a sketchy repair shop), or bought it pre-owned, or if I "lost" it and gets returned to me.

[grishka]

Let's start with the fact that unlocking the bootloader wipes the entire /data partition to prevent this exact scenario from happening.

[sangnoir]

That'a a great point, and you're correct on the impracticality of the evil-maid attack. However, my point remains when it comes to less-than-honest repair shops or second-hand sales where wiped devices are not suspicious. I want to know if my bootloader/kernel may have been tampered with before I am able to trust the apps.

[feikname]

I wish I could have thought of that argument on a previous discussion about iPhone/ iPad jailbreak discussion thread

[mschuster91]

There is a fix for SafetyNet - it forces the client-side library to assume that there is no hardware co-processor.

[grishka]

It's bound to break in the future. Google will stop, if didn't already, certifying devices that lack the TEE.

The issue I'm pointing out is that this device integrity thing exists at all, and that Google ends up having more control over the device and its capabilities than its legitimate owner.