[roughly]

Incidentally, “tragedy of the commons” is one of those things like “inventing money because barter is inefficient” that exists in the lore of economists but doesn’t seem to exist in the real world, and most societies at most times in most places in history seem to have done just fine managing “the commons” as a shared resource through social compact and peer pressure.

[elliekelly]

> and most societies at most times in most places in history seem to have done just fine managing “the commons” as a shared resource through social compact and peer pressure.

What? Clean water, clean air, deforestation, overfishing, noise pollution. There are infinite externalities that have been shifted onto the commons that social compact and peer pressure haven’t (and arguably won’t) solve.

[bscphil]

I think your parent comment is thinking about the world before privatization, where most resources are understood to be the collective property (and responsibility) of the community, and the community itself enforced rules intended to make sure that the resources were well managed.

Once you start talking about the modern, post-privatization world, things are different of course. Resources like water may be in theory community managed, but in practice private for-profit entities acquire the right to extract as much as they can. Think Nestle and water for example.

That said, I think privatization was inevitable. I don't think it makes sense to long for the days where community management was possible, because that was probably always limited to rather local resources and not to handling global problems like climate change. (Maybe a "global community" is possible in some utopian future, but thinking about that doesn't seem like a way to solve the problems we have now.)

[roughly]

> I think your parent comment is thinking about the world before privatization, where most resources are understood to be the collective property (and responsibility) of the community, and the community itself enforced rules intended to make sure that the resources were well managed.

Yeah, and I understand what we've got right now ain't that.

I think the two requirements for that kind of community governance are 1) relatively stable long-term relationships - ie, stakeholders are well known to each other and expect to bear the long-term costs of their decisions - and 2) relatively evenly distributed power, such that no one actor can ignore the will of the overall group.

Broadly, I think there are two changes in the modern world that put an end to that, both technological - 1) transportation technology increased to the point where it's no longer a given that people will effectively stay in one place for their entire lives, which affects both how people see their surroundings and what they can assume of others, and 2) mechanization increased both the scale of resource extraction we're capable of and the power disparity we can bring to bear if, say, the Crown agrees with us.

> That said, I think privatization was inevitable.

Broadly I agree. I'm not sure privatization as we have it was inevitable, but I think given technology progressing to even trains and rifles is sufficient to disrupt the social and psychological world in which most resources were held in common.

> I don't think it makes sense to long for the days where community management was possible, because that was probably always limited to rather local resources and not to handling global problems like climate change. (Maybe a "global community" is possible in some utopian future, but thinking about that doesn't seem like a way to solve the problems we have now.)

Part of why I push back on the idea of "the tragedy of the commons" is because it fosters a narrative of human beings as inescapably greedy and incapable of acting communally at any scale, and that's simply incorrect. I don't know what a "global community" would look like, but I think if we've any hope of achieving some kind of headway against climate change, we need more narratives encouraging us to be members of a community and fewer telling us we're "rational actors."

[freeone3000]

Because one side clearly isn't a peer. If, say, Microsoft decided to go full renewable, then there'd be pressure for everyone else to. If it's a bunch of unimportant people against a corporation with the money to obtain its rights, well!

[mucholove]

As you point out—there are also fantastic administrations of shared resources.

For example, many fisheries in the USA have recovered tremendously through smart limits. The Atlantic cod fishery is often cited. I personally have experienced the Pacific North West salmon fishery and can confirm that the fishing gets better up there every year while the Dominican fishery gets worse. The DR fishery has experienced the tragedy of the commons.

The DR also experienced fantastic forest preservation in the 1970s. This was after all the old growth was destroyed. There was a success of the commons following a tremendous tragedy. Still, in the last few years these old laws have been disrespected and so the forests have been decimated to make way for Haas avocado plants. Do not buy Dominican Haas avocado.

The tragedy of the commons is very real. Learn more about the success and failure of different shared resources through Elinor Ostrom’s work.

[ncmncm]

The Atlantic cod fishery is an example of massive failure. Any perception of apparent recovery has to limit its scope to the very recent past.

[marcusverus]

> Incidentally, “tragedy of the commons” is one of those things like “inventing money because barter is inefficient” that exists in the lore of economists but doesn’t seem to exist in the real world.

Could you elaborate on how "'inventing money because barter is inefficient' doesn't seem to exist in the real world"? The idea that barter's inefficiency drives demand for money seems to me to be self-evidently true, so I'd be interested to hear a different perspective.

[rsa4046]

David Graeber has argued persuasively that there is little real anthropological evidence to support the notion that money arose from the ‘inefficiency of barter’. [1—3]

1. https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/david-graeber-on-the.... 2. https://newrepublic.com/article/159227/david-graeber-changed... 3. Graeber D. 2011. ‘Debt: The First 5000 Years'. Melville House, NY

[Aunche]

This just shows that economists are poor historians. It doesn't change how money enables more efficient and sophisticated forms of commerce than than barter or a credit social credit system.

[roughly]

> This just shows that economists are poor historians

F*ck me, if that's the only thing you take away from this thread I'll have done my job. The problem is they keep taking that poor history and using it to spin tales about humans as greed-stricken robots who'd sell their grandmas if it would generate a dollar more value than whatever you want to price a plate of fresh-baked cookies at, and the bigger problem is we've built an entire society and economy off their collective delusions.

[Aunche]

I didn't read the book, but from the summaries I don't find Graeber's thesis any more convincing. It's not like people who lived in pre-money societies sang Kumbaya all day. They pillaged each other all the same. Sure, money was able to finance armies that did this with more efficiency, but you can say the advances in metallurgy were made with nefarious motivations. That doesn't make the advancement bad in itself.

[cool_dude85]

But that has cause and effect backwards. Nobody is claiming that money does not do that, but that it did not arise because of the inefficiency of barter.

[andrekandre]

i havent read the book yet, but i am surmising that the claim is that money originally arose in order to service debts, not because (at that time) it was more efficient?

[roughly]

No - the claim is that money fundamentally arose for taxation (either to the government or to the priests), and may also have been useful for long distance trade between partners with no expected long term relationships.

[roughly]

> Could you elaborate on how "'inventing money because barter is inefficient' doesn't seem to exist in the real world"? The idea that barter's inefficiency drives demand for money seems to me to be self-evidently true, so I'd be interested to hear a different perspective.

Others point out Debt below, and that's the canonical argument here. Effectively, the kinds of small societies that most people lived in for most of human history manage exchange based on personal relationships and reciprocal exchange, not abstract or closed monetary transactions. Money arises in the context of either long-range trade, in which sustained relationships aren't guaranteed, or in the context of large states which actually require some form of bookkeeping to track things like taxes and tribute.

The "self-evident" nature of the "barter becomes money" story is the origin myth of Economics - it absolutely sounds like a way things could have happened and feels deeply plausible, but there's no evidence it did.

[rentnorove]

GP may be referring to anthropologist David's Graeber's book: "Debt", which refutes that idea: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6617037-debt

[nanis]

> most societies at most times in most places in history seem to have done just fine managing “the commons”

You mean through exclusionary rules, investing in monitoring and punishment etc all of which divert resources from the productive activity solely by the existence of the incentive to overuse the "commons" or others' goodwill.

True, while the subgame unique subgame perfect equilibrium of most models is full free-riding, most lab experiments show less than full free-riding. That does not mean the incentives are not there.

Why are dorm bathrooms not as clean as bathrooms in your house?

> inventing money because barter is inefficient

That's a silly statement: No one decided to invent money in a similar process of invention like the lightbulb. Instead, coins, tokens, and other recognized mediums of exchange dominated over barter because barter is inconvenient and inefficient.

Even animals can learn to use a medium of exchange[1].

[1]:https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/090608095044.h...

[roughly]

> You mean through exclusionary rules, investing in monitoring and punishment etc all of which divert resources from the productive activity solely by the existence of the incentive to overuse the "commons" or others' goodwill.

No, I mean through collective policing and social pressure. In villages before privatizaton, free-riders faced social pressure, shame, and other consequences for violating the group trust. This is how most societies operated for the bulk of human history.

> True, while the subgame unique subgame perfect equilibrium of most models is full free-riding, most lab experiments show less than full free-riding. That does not mean the incentives are not there.

The lab experiments show "less than full free-riding" because humans are predominantly a social species, not a value-maximizing algorithm.

> That's a silly statement: No one decided to invent money in a similar process of invention like the lightbulb. Instead, coins, tokens, and other recognized mediums of exchange dominated over barter because barter is inconvenient and inefficient.

Except there's no historical record of that happening anywhere. The two things that look like money are trade goods between distant groups and coinage required by rulers for taxes or tribute. There's no record of money being invented de novo to replace barter in societies which didn't already have it.

> Even animals can learn to use a medium of exchange[1].

Obviously, but I haven't seen any record of chimps spontaneously deciding to coin money, so I'm not sure what the point here is.

Edit for the point I missed:

> Why are dorm bathrooms not as clean as bathrooms in your house?

Because my mother doesn't live in the dorm.

[tomcam]

How about rampant overfishing in the world seas right now?

[NeutralForest]

This is a very wrong take

[megablast]

Wow. You got your two main point completely wrong.