[fmoralesc]

One assumption there is that testimony can provide you with justification. We are told by the article that Edmund Gettier has died earlier this year, and we seem to be justified in believing that. In that case, let's assume, justification and truth matches. But this isn't the case always. You may see that the color of the wall is red, for example, and may feel prima facie justified in believing that the wall is red. But it may be the case that, unknown to you, there is a red light projected over the wall, which is actually cream color. In an absolute sense, you are wrong, but your belief is still justified. 'Justified' and 'true' are used for different purposes.

[allturtles]

Okay, I buy that, you can have a justified belief that isn't true, if justification is itself subjective/probabilistic rather than deductive.

Then this paper argues that you can have a justified belief that is true, but still isn't knowledge. Why? Because the justification is faulty. Well sure, since we've admitted in the first place that justifications can be faulty. So why would you ever assume that they invariably lead to knowledge? Had the concept of believing right thing for the wrong reasons not been invented in the 1960s?

I just can't get myself into a mindset where this is a revelatory finding, but maybe I'm too steeped in a bayesian worldview.

[natt941]

Just to be clear, it isn't that people though justification (which, yes, can be probabilistic/non-deductive) invariable leads to knowledge, and these aren't supposed to be cases of believing the right thing for the wrong reasons.

Suppose you grant that justification is probabilistic. What's the extra condition that makes justified belief count as knowledge? Pre-Gettier, one might have been inclined to say that it's that your justified belief is actually right—what you believe is true. Gettier's point is that this can't be the full explanation of the difference between merely justified belief and knowledge.

Similarly, suppose you grant that one can have true belief that falls short of knowledge because one lacks "right reasons". Well, "right reasons" is a tricky notion, but suppose this means something like good evidence, or more generally, the sorts of reasons that we take to show your reasoning in a responsible way. Again, Gettier's point is that good evidence or responsible belief (assuming this isn't limited to deduction from things that you're certain about) isn't sufficient to make true belief into knowledge.

(Fwiw, Gettier wasn't the first person to point this out, but he did it in an especially vivid way which got a lot of people thinking hard about what else you needed to say if you were going to explain the difference between mere justified true belief and knowledge.)

[allturtles]

> Suppose you grant that justification is probabilistic. What's the extra condition that makes justified belief count as knowledge? Pre-Gettier, one might have been inclined to say that it's that your justified belief is actually right—what you believe is true.

I would say that what makes it count as knowledge is the quality of the justification. If Jones had seen a written job offer to Smith rather than just hearsay that he would get the job, his belief that Smith would get the job would probably count as 'knowledge.'

Requiring that what you believe be actually true to count as knowledge is begging the question, since that requires either already having 'knowledge' that it's true, or having direct access to objective reality that no one has.

[natt941]

If "quality" means something like strength of the evidence, then couldn't you still have Gettier-like cases, so long as the evidence doesn't entail the truth of the belief? (suppose the HR department printed the wrong name on the offer letter, etc.)

If "quality" doesn't mean this... then the worry is that you've just labeled what you were trying to explain, because "quality of justification" might mean something like "that thing, whatever it is, which makes a belief count as knowledge".

About truth as a condition for knowledge... there's a lot of subtlety here. The claim isn't that you have to first know that P is true in order for you to know that P, or that you have to provide the truth of P as one of the reasons why you know P, or anything like that. It's more of a logical claim about what it means when we say "S knows that P"... knowledge is "factive" in that you can't know P if P is false. At least, that's how philosophers use the word "know", and it's at least one of the common ways that ordinary folk use the word.

(For what it's worth, there's a lot of discussion amongst philosophers about whether anyone who knows that P also has to know that they know that P... plenty of philosophers deny this.)

[allturtles]

> If "quality" means something like strength of the evidence, then couldn't you still have Gettier-like cases, so long as the evidence doesn't entail the truth of the belief? (suppose the HR department printed the wrong name on the offer letter, etc.)

It would entail Gettier-like cases if you require knowledge to be true in some absolute sense. But I'm discarding the "true" condition as a requirement of a knowledge. Outside of a few domains like math, knowledge of this kind doesn't exist. Knowledge is always subject to revision.

[natt941]

Often we might think we know something and later conclude that we were wrong... but in this case, it's common to say "I thought I knew such-and-such, but I didn't". Also, for what it's worth, most people don't think that knowing that P requires that you're certain that P.

At least, that's one way of using the word "know". So if we're trying to give an analysis of this thing, we can't just decide to discard truth as a requirement of knowledge... the goal is to give an analysis of this thing that people talk about, not replace it with something else.

That said, it sounds like you're sympathetic to a line of thought on which this so-called "traditional" conception of knowledge isn't very useful, and we should focus on the sorts of things that Bayesian epistemology focuses on... something like degrees of confidence.

[fmoralesc]

The problem is that if your definition of knowledge requires only three conditions (belief, truth and justification), then it has counterexamples, namely, the Gettier cases. So we need to either revise our concept of justification (for example, make it so that a knowledge-apt belief is justified only if it is for the right reasons -- but then, how to account for justified but false beliefs?), look for ways to supplement the analysis with additional conditions (for example, that the conditions are satisfied in a robust ways counterfactually), or reject the idea that knowledge can be analyzed altogether.

To make it more concrete how this sort of thing can get complicated quickly, consider your own explanation of the case. As I take it, you think that the issue is that "the justification is faulty". But how is it faulty, besides not being true (remember, we have reasons to want justification to not imply truth)? And also, there are Gettier-like cases where we cannot say that justification is faulty or where we can't find false premises (for example, cases where it seems like the problem is that the individuals in questions are not in an appropriate environment, see [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#False_premises...)).

[allturtles]

Thanks for engaging in the conversation. When I say "the justification is faulty" I just mean it's not deductively air-tight, therefore we can't assume that it leads to truth. In this sense, pretty much all justifications are 'faulty.'

The thing I'm struggling with here, ultimately, is truth. All of these problems rely on some outside, oracular knowledge of what is true, (e.g. in the example you linked there really is a cow/sheep in the field, or Mark is really hiding under the desk). But we have no such oracle to refer to, so trying to ground knowledge in truth seems like a lost cause in the first place. All we can have is more or less certain beliefs.

[13415]

Sure, from a present perspective on epistemology this may make sense, since we now know all the troubles and faulty attempts to decide proper justifications from incorrect ones after Gettier's paper. However, back then the idea to define knowledge using JTB was on the table. The knowledge as justified true belief view is about a definition of knowledge, not a learning method or how to gain knowledge. Many authors would even have rejected the idea of graded belief entirely and said you either believe something or don't (many still do).

Since you accept the notion of truth (otherwise you couldn't be a Bayesian), you'd have to explain why you reject the realist conception of knowledge inherent to the JTB view. Gettier's paper is one attack on it, arguing for graded belief representations is another type of attack on it. In this context it is worth noting that graded belief and categorical belief are very hard to reconcile because they have different logical properties [1]. It's known as Locke's Thesis and quite a vexing problem.

That being said, I share your intuitions. The factivity of knowledge has created more problems in epistemology than the notion of knowledge was supposed to solve. The German word Erkenntnis in Erkenntnistheorie has a meaning closer to learning theory. AFAIK there is no good equivalent to this in English.

[1] http://fitelson.org/coherence/hawthorne.pdf