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by eplanit 1742 days ago
The (proper) strategic idea was as a deterrent, not _wanting_ to use them in an offensive manner. The strategy was in making an attack on "us" carry the high probability of annihilation of the attacker, thereby discouraging it -- it wasn't about "hey, let's nuke that country, then we'll gain an advantage".
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That came later iirc - initially they were thinking of using them prior to running infantry in.

I think there are old public test videos where they actually did this kind of thing.

I also recall a group of scientists trying to elevate the understanding of the e-risk (pugwash conference?).

Basically people were becoming too comfortable with the idea of nuclear war because they knew how to “duck and cover” and had a little bomb shelter in the yard.

See this: https://youtu.be/IKqXu-5jw60

Dr. Strangelove is also worth watching for a satirical take from that time.

>> The (proper) strategic idea was as a deterrent, not _wanting_ to use them in an offensive manner. The strategy was in making an attack on "us" carry the high probability of annihilation for the attacker, thereby discouraging it -- it wasn't about "hey, let's nuke that country, then we'll gain an advantage".

> That came later iirc - initially they were thinking of using them prior to running infantry in.

I think you have to differentiate strategic and battlefield usages. IIRC, some people considered using them strategically when the opponent couldn't retaliate in kind. However, the Soviets had them within five years and the Chinese had them by 1965, I think.

I think tactical battlefield uses were on the table for much longer, because NATO felt like it could not win a conventional war in Europe, but that may have taken the form a nuking a corn field on your border (maybe even in your territory) that the invading army is passing through. It sounds like Russia may still have similar plans ("escalate to de-escalate" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon).

It's impossible to know what would have happened if they hadn't, but if Julius and Ethel Rosenberg helping the Soviets achieve nuclear parity prevented the US from "using them when the opponent couldn't retaliate in kind" then they should be thought of like Snowdens or Assanges.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julius_and_Ethel_Rosenberg#Sov...

> It's impossible to know what would have happened if they hadn't, but if Julius and Ethel Rosenberg helping the Soviets achieve nuclear parity prevented the US from "using them when the opponent couldn't retaliate in kind" then they should be thought of like Snowdens or Assanges.

Eh, no. The Rosenbergs were consciously acting as spies for a foreign power, which is treasonous conduct no matter how you look at it.

Putting them next to Snowden makes Snowden look bad. At least publicly, he made every effort to avoid doing anything like what they did.

Also, IIRC, MacArthur was relieved of command in Korea because he wanted to nuke the Chinese, and that was decades before they even had an atomic weapon to retaliate with. That means you can't point to nuclear parity as the only reason the US didn't use them after the end of WWII.

The degree to which our ethics should be consequentialist, or they should evaluate intent is worth discussing, but as consequences become more significant intent becomes more insignificant. I don't care if someone 'looks bad', or breaks any law if they prevent nuclear war.

Stanislav Petrov disobeyed orders in the face of "30 layers of verification" telling him to report 5 incoming nuclear missiles.

> I don't care if someone 'looks bad', or breaks any law if they prevent nuclear war.

The idea that the Rosenbergs prevented a nuclear war is wild speculation on top of wild speculation.

However, comparing Snowden to the Rosenbergs is exactly the kind of thing that people do to smear Snowden.

Eh, they sent the USSR a couple of drawings of circles, and Ethel Rosenberg apparently did some typing. They were, loosely, spies for a foreign power, but their impact was absolutely negligible and their execution was essentially a lynching.
> Eh, they sent the USSR a couple of drawings of circles, and Ethel Rosenberg apparently did some typing.

And all Snowden did was copy some files to some flash drives. Describing significant acts in a mundane way doesn't make them less significant, it just omits all the important facts.

> They were, loosely, spies for a foreign power, but their impact was absolutely negligible

This doesn't sound like "loosely":

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semyon_Semyonov

> In 1942 Semyonov persuaded Vasily Zarubin to transfer Julius Rosenberg and his contacts from the CPUSA-Jacob Golos channel to the direct control of the Rezidentura, with himself as the assigned case officer. The actual transfer occurred on Labor Day weekend, 7 September 1942, at a meeting in Central Park. Bernard Schuster brought Rosenberg to the meeting. Rosenberg was then subjected to a thorough vetting and recruitment process to include training in tradecraft and a probationary period. Alexander Feklisov was assigned to assist in managing Rosenberg. Once the formal recruitment of Rosenberg was completed Semyonov used Rosenberg to conduct formal recruitments of two of Rosenberg's friends from City College of New York, Joel Barr and William Perl.

Impact is also irrelevant. If someone robs a bank, but does it incompetently and only makes off with $50, they're still guilty of robbery.

or at sea! Nuclear mines, torpedos, etc. A lot easier to take out that SSBN or carrier I guess.
Something unforgettable here:

Nuclear test in China, with supporting attacks by infantry and cavalry, all in grand heroic style.

3 1/2 minutes: https://youtu.be/CzRX06Xqu80

or the quick version: https://youtu.be/CzRX06Xqu80?t=81

Looks like a similar idea to the Desert Rock tests [1]. Though I don't think any of the Desert Rock soldiers galloped onto an atomic battlefield on horseback while wearing a gas mask and wielding a sword like one of the guys in your video did.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tXX-1MIMr2E

> Though I don't think any of the Desert Rock soldiers galloped onto an atomic battlefield on horseback while wearing a gas mask and wielding a sword like one of the guys in your video did.

I should note the horses are wearing gas masks too.

Interesting, thanks.
Well it was at first. Even after Japan, the US Airforce considered nuking Korea, but were eventually convinced not to by the Marines and Army who argued that deploying nuclear weapons risked a similar move by the Soviets on the battlefield where soldiers were centralized. Remember that the nukes back then were much, much smaller.

Also, a bit of a nitpick, but we do use nuclear weapons. We have for the past 70+ years. We haven't deployed them since Japan, but their role as a deterrent is a form of use.

> we do use nuclear weapons [in] their role as a deterrent

Yeah, I first heard this idea as the main point of Daniel Ellsberg's (also known for his first book, 'The Pentagon Papers' on Vietnam strategy) recent book 'The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner' [0] which documents the USA's 'use' of nuclear weapons, based on his work at RAND. It was a really interesting read, would recommend.

0. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Ellsberg#Books

> it wasn't about "hey, let's nuke that country, then we'll gain an advantage".

Initially LeMay wanted to strike the Soviets first with nukes while the US had the monopoly on that technology, because his reasoning was that when the Soviets would have it, they would not hesitate one second to strike the US with it.

I can see his point, in the context of the time. Glad that nobody followed his recommendations, though!