[anonypla]

Old but relevant https://defuse.ca/truecrypt-plausible-deniability-useless-by... .Be careful with plausible deniability depending on your threat model as it's only efficient against a soft "lawful" adversary. It's probably a terrible idea against an adversary willing to resort to "enhanced interrogation techniques" (not mentioning the usual 5$ xkcd).

[zorggish]

This article is about the problem of using TrueCrypt, which allows you to create a single hidden layer; In case TrueCrypt usage is detected, the requirement to give out the hidden layer password would be quite reasonable, because then you can be sure that the container is decrypted in its entirety. In the case of FractalCrypt, only part of the container can be decrypted, even knowing all the passwords; hence, denying the existence of truly secret data can be quite convincing, for example, by first giving out unclassified, and after a long interrogation giving out semisecret ones.

In addition, the article states that > In other scenarios the feature can be useful. If the attacker has limited resources (i.e. can only torture you for 30 minutes), or if you are "innocent until proven guilty" under the law, then it can be advantageous to use a hidden volume. Just don't recommend TrueCrypt to your friends in North Korea, or at least make sure they use a hidden volume.

In most situations, such as a police raid or criminal robbery, you will not be tortured to death. However, it is really better not to use FractalCrypt in North Korea.