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by dane-pgp
1743 days ago
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> until they get the data they want. The game theory here is interesting. If they are sure that you have the information (for example, the private key to your bitcoin wallet) then "plausible deniability" isn't really a useful feature. It means you can credibly bluff "The key isn't on this device", but they can just torture you until you reveal which device it is on. In contrast, the threat model of Rubberhose[0] assumes that the secret police believe that you have an incriminating file on your device, but they aren't sure. That means if you are innocent and disclose all your passwords to them, they won't be satisfied and will have to keep on torturing you forever, hoping that you might give them the information you don't actually have. Therefore they have to convince you that there is some information that you could hand over which would satisfy them, and they mustn't over-estimate what information you have, otherwise they are committing to torturing you forever and there is no advantage to you disclosing even the information you do have. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29 |
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But with something that has an arbitrary number of hidden volumes, you have no way to prove it and they can interrogate you forever.