| What you call an originalist, is what I call a legal historian/linguist. The judiciary is not there to write law. Only to interpret what is written. An Originalist would do research on the era any piece of legislation, statute, or case law was decided to ensure that the meaning and intent of it through the lense of that time period is still honored. Without doing that, it's virtually guaranteed that within a few centuries, your language will have drifted so far away from the original intent or way of life rendered by the text would become meaningless. Think of it like getting the source code for a program that references external libraries. You can't run it now, because things have changed, among them, society's API's and symbols have as well. An Originalist is someone that goes back and attempts to reconstruct the "societal runtime" of that time to ensure we're not applying the statute in a way that may make sense from a modern point of view, but runs completely counter to the intent and spirit in which the law was actually made. It makes complete sense once you've been handed code that you can't find the source to the dependencies of and have to figure out a way to get it to work. |
And both case suffer from the same thing described above: is there even a single original meaning/intent? Can we unambiguously understand it today? Can it be applied to today's context?
If we take your code example, what if you inherit a codebase that used some specific networks calls that do not exist anymore and that predate https. Would you reimplement it in exact the same way and skip the whole authentication, at risk of having something extremely limited? Would you have it accept https connections? But how would you know if the original authors would be ok with a security layer that depends on central certificates? Sure you could say "the dependency is immutable, it will do no less or more than what was possible in the original context it was created, anything else needs a need dependency" and then suddenly you end up with a second amendment that only concerns 18th century weapons.