[Matticus_Rex]

There are very few defensible historical positions that seem to rile up unreasonable criticism more than saying the use of atomic weapons on Japan might not have been justified, usually in the form of uneducated meme responses such as "they would never have surrendered" and "it's easy to say that now."

Given that we have evidence that many of those who were there at the time disagreed with the decision and that Japan had already been trying to work towards peace through back-channels, these responses seem to point to a deep need to feel like the United States didn't unjustifiably kill over 100k civilians.

There is little question that the bombings were a better strategic choice than Operation Downfall, which would likely have killed more on both sides, but to paint this as the only alternative is a false dilemma. There is even debate among (prominent, non-revisionist) historians and political scientists as to whether the bombings were the primary reason for the surrender -- contemporary letters from within Japan indicate that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria may have actually been the primary factor (though the bombings certainly played some part, and were a larger factor in arguments made by some particular officials).

[mezentius]

I would argue the opposite; criticism of the use of atomic weapons on Japan tends to ramp up during periods of increasing skepticism toward American power (e.g., now). Unfortunately, that criticism is rarely rooted in credible historical argument. I wouldn't say you're arguing from a "uneducated meme response," but I would say that the position that you're taking is the symptom of a post-Vietnam/Watergate narrative regarding CIA conspiracies, the legitimacy of war, and the trustworthiness of American authority. It is, however, not a terribly useful way to approach the context of 1945.

While it is possible to find negative quotes from various individuals, such as the aforementioned Halsey, the question is really whether the people involved in the decision were making it in 'good faith' (i.e. out of the perceived necessity of ending the war on rational terms, and not diplomatic stick-shaking or the need to show off one's latest toys). Overwhelmingly, the primary sources argue that they were, and that the most salient concern was ensuring an unconditional surrender to avoid the mistakes made after the last war, in which the sociopolitical structures that enabled militarism were left intact. The "peace" that Japan was offering would have left its extremely dysfunctional political structures intact, and so was considered unacceptable.

The number of dead, and manner of their death, must also be seen in the context of the time. It doesn't really matter what we believe about the morality of targeting civilians in 2021; by 1945, that particular Rubicon had been crossed years before, and not just by the Allies. The Japanese Army committed atrocities on such a scale as to poison attitudes about the country to this very day; there is a good reason that people in China or the Philippines may roll their eyes when reading about poor Sadako and her thousand paper cranes (a story popularized by a 1977 Canadian novel).

I write this not to minimize any healthy sense of horror or responsibility, but to point out that "it's easy to say that now" is not merely a meme, but in this case responsible historical practice.

[dghlsakjg]

I think there is maybe a middle ground.

It is entirely possible that the decision to drop the bomb was made in good faith, but that the Japanese were already committed to surrender. The fog of war is very real (as this month has reminded us).

In context, the Hiroshima bombing wasn't the most deadly or the most destructive bombing of the war. The Tokyo firebombing takes that honor. Given that the US Army was in the habit of wiping cities off the map at will BEFORE Hiroshima, I wonder how much of an influence the bomb really could have had in 3 days...

The other side of it is that American history really undervalues the soviet contribution to the war. The US conventional story fully ignores that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was cited by Japanese leadership as one of the reasons for full acceptance of the Potsdam declaration.

I don't disagree with what you are saying, but the conventional narrative that nuking two cities was the ONLY way to end the war really seems like an oversimplification of a very complex situation.

As you mention "total war" was already fully accepted, but I wish that that the complexity of the full situation was taught

[mezentius]

My sticking point with that would be the point about the Japanese having "committed to surrender" prior to the bombs being dropped, which can't really be argued convincingly. The dysfunctional Japanese military hierarchy had trouble committing to anything short of aggressive militarism, which was a major reason for the war being launched in the first place, then continued despite the obvious hopelessness of the Japanese position. Even after the Emperor had officially ordered surrender (via a radio address, in which he explicitly mentioned the influence of the atomic bombs), a group of Japanese officers attempted to depose him in a coup—and this was far from an unprecedented event in a political environment that often punished any public position short of fanatical hawkishness with assassination.

To argue that the atomic bombs were not decisive requires ignoring a lot of primary source evidence—including the declaration of surrender read by the Emperor to the Japanese people—in favor of mostly conspiratorial innuendo that is only convincing to those already inclined to be skeptical of contemporary American power structures. Beyond that, the argument seems to assume an omniscience on the part of Allied leaders. What was known at the time was that Japanese soldiers were often fighting to the last man, holding hopeless positions for the purpose of causing as many casualties to the enemy as possible, and that because of this American political will to continue the war was wavering, putting the goal of victory by unconditional surrender in doubt. In that context it was deemed necessary to end the war as quickly as possible.

I don't think that anyone would argue that dropping the atomic bombs was the only way to end the war. Alternatives were considered—but it was thought that those alternatives would result in an unsatisfactory postwar settlement, and simply repeat mistakes made in the aftermath of the last great war. In short, if the last years of the war were conducted with great brutality, it was because they were intended to be decisive.

(I don't disagree with you that a lot of popular Western histories undervalue contributions by the Soviet Union, but that largely applies to the war against Germany and its European allies, not the war in the Pacific. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, for example, was probably a contributing factor to the collapse of support for the war, but far from a decisive one.)

[Matticus_Rex]

If arguing that the atomic bombs were not decisive is conspiratorial, then a lot of respected, mainstream subject matter experts are conspiracy theorists.

EDIT: For some reason I can't reply to the child comment, so I'll address it here. I'm not talking about pundits. I'm talking about historians and political scientists, arguing compellingly from evidence. This case is drastically overstated, and mainstream, pro-military sources have been on both sides of the debate since the beginning (including the US Strategic Bombing Survey, which affirmed the usefulness of most other US bombing plans, and yet found that "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."). The anti-bomb side also includes such obscure (/s) academic figures as Robert Pape, Gar Alperovitz, and Stephen Peter Rosen (certainly no anti-war/anti-government figure), as well as military contemporaries such as Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, William Leahy, William Halsey, Curtis LeMay, and Dwight Eisenhower.

The suggestion that this position is fringe or conspiracy-esque is simply not tenable.

[mezentius]

I'll put it this way: in popular culture, the controversy over the use of atomic weapons by America goes beyond purely what can be proved, and has instead become a proxy war for other contemporary political issues. (This is not a new phenomenon, and the history of Hiroshima discourse is a fascinating subject in itself.) You will no doubt find some 'mainstream' pundits—even NY Times op-ed authors—willing to carry water for the notion that the use of the atomic bomb was unnecessary, and furthermore known to be unnecessary by the principals at the time.

The evidence, however, does not support it.

EDIT: To respond to your edit, statements of opinion made by American military figures after the war are not considered convincing. A lot of our war scholarship used to be based on statements made by participants after the war, but we have become increasingly skeptical of this approach, for good reason. For example, our narrative about the German invasion of the Soviet Union used to be largely based on the postwar testimonies of Nazi generals. However new examination of primary sources—i.e. records, receipts, transcripts of meetings (some of which were previously buried in Soviet archives)—have shown that their testimonies were often extremely inaccurate, misleading, self-serving, or else calculated to produce a political effect in a Cold War context.

For the same reason, what figures like Halsey—and particularly Douglas MacArthur, an unreliable narrator worthy of "Pale Fire"—have to say about whether the atomic bombs were decisive should provoke skepticism at best. And this is not just because they were political figures and seasoned inter-service warriors, jockeying for position in a postwar hierarchy, but because they weren't there. The best way to determine whether the bomb was decisive is to examine primary sources, both in the American and Japanese context, some of which have been posted elsewhere in this thread.

By examining those sources you cannot really make the case that the bomb was not decisive, nor can you claim that the decision to use the bomb was primarily motivated by factors other than the urgent need to end the war quickly. While some people may indeed make that argument, they are relying on questionable postwar statements of opinion, with no convincing evidence to support them.