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by xh-dude
1761 days ago
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There is an argument that the ‘stay and tolerate the corruption for another generation’ strategy would eventually outlast native “Taliban” resistance - this is the path the U.S. was on, fairly explicitly since 2010 or so. In a realist framing, this is something that deserved more careful consideration before, and also now, in the aftermath. Look at the outcomes for Karzai and Ghani as an indicator - I don’t know that ‘popular support’ is something to attribute to the Taliban but we ought to entertain the notion that the framing of Afghanistan for domestic consumption in the U.S. distorts a useful, realist analysis. How could we arrive at the current state of things if, outside of Kabul, the dynamics were as simple as painting a target on the Taliban? |
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