[shuckles]

What abuses apply to CSAM scanning in this hybrid pipeline which don’t apply to iCloud Backup? If they scanned on the server, why couldn’t governments “slippery slope” abuse the system by requiring that all files on iOS end up in iCloud Backup, where they can be scanned by the system?

Since the announcement, I can think of a dozen ways Apple could be easily forced into scanning all the contents of your device by assembling features they’ve already shipped. Yet they haven’t. At some point, people need to produce evidence that Apple cannot hold the line they’ve said they will.

[int_19h]

The governments always could do that, but then they'd be the target of the pushback, and there's already significant mistrust of governments wrt surveillance because of how it can be abused.

What we have now is Apple, with its "strong privacy" record, normalizing this. If it succeeds, it would be that much easier for the governments to tackle other stuff onto it. Or, say, lower the threshold needed to submit images for review. I can easily picture some senator ranting about how unacceptable it is that somebody with only 20 CSAM photos won't be flagged, and won't somebody please think of the children?

And yes, if it comes to that, Apple definitely cannot hold the line. After all, they already didn't hold it on encrypted cloud storage - and that wasn't even legally forced on them, merely "not recommended".

[candiodari]

Exactly. Also people are strongly objecting that their own device is being used to report them to law enforcement. Surely someone at Apple noticed this beforehand ...