[CoolGuySteve]

Should they even be doing that though? It seems like a matter of time before it's possible to SWAT somebody by sending them a series of hash colliding image files given how not cryptographically secure the hash algorithm is.

I think I'm not the only one who'd rather not have my devices call the cops on me in a country where the cops are already way too violent.

[slg]

But this doesn't change any of that. It only changes whether the scanning happens on your device as part of the upload process instead of on the server after the upload.

[CoolGuySteve]

Yeah that’s right and I don’t think either method is ethical.

[simondotau]

Ethics aside, on-device scanning has the benefit of Constitutional protection, at least in the USA. Any attempt by the Government to compel Apple to expand the on-device searching of privately owned devices to find other things would be a clear-cut 4th Amendment violation.

[lupire]

Then don't ask other peole to hold your non encrypted files for you.

[UncleMeat]

You could already just send them CSAM. That is a lot easier than finding a hash collision that also appears to be illegal content when downscaled and viewed by a human.

[croutonwagon]

The human review phase is supposed to explicitly prevent that. Im not sure I would but my faith there, especially if its a flood of colisions and they are rated/paid on case clearance rate.

Further, this is step 1 of a process they have explicitly said they are looking to expand on [1], even going as far to state it in bold font with a standout color.

So theres no telling that they wont expand it by simply scanning everything, regardless of icloud usage, or pivot it to other combat "domestic terrorism" or "gun violence epidemics" or whatever else they feel like.

Its an erosion of trust, even if not a full stop erosion, its something they intend to expand upon and wont be taking back.

[1] https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_...