[idunnoman]

I think the main issue is just that Pandora's box is now open. Once you make this move, you can't go backwards.

If you'll indulge me, would you bet $1000 that this style of scanning isn't expanded in the next 3 years to include non-CSAM content?

[sharikous]

Not in three years, but in 10 I am almost sure it will. After making it completely impossible for a citizen to survive without a device.

They are winning the battle in incremental steps, they have no need to rush.

[samrolken]

I will take you up on that bet. Feel free to contact me and we can set it up.

[idunnoman]

Would you take the 10 year version of that bet?

I'm less interested in the actual bet. I'm more interested in trying to understand if we both think this system will eventually be abused.

If you WOULD take the 10 year version, would you take an open ended "some point in the future, this will be abused" bet?

[samrolken]

I would probably take a 10 year version of that bet.

I would probably also take a more broad version of that bet, if we agreed upon a good definition of "abuse".

10 years is tricky though, because this topic has a political angle about it.

I look at this stuff as a political move by Apple as much as anything else. There's a lot of political pressure around encryption, and the "think of the children" angle is very compelling for a lot of people. This CSAM voucher system is cleverly designed to handle that concern without compromising privacy or security for anyone who isn't uploading multiple previously-known CSAM images to their iCloud Photo Library.

How this political situation will unfold over the next 10 years is hard to say. I hope for the best. But it's important for threats to privacy and security to be challenged.

I have wished for more legitimate and valid criticism of this system. Almost every criticism that I've seen is based on plain misunderstandings of how the system works, which isn't helpful.