[nojito]

Apple doesn’t scan iCloud for CSAM and refuses to do it. Which is why they researched intensively on differential privacy.

[sneak]

But they could, as iCloud Photos is not e2e (Apple can read all of it) and they turn over the user data on over 30,000 users per year to the USG without even a warrant.

This is just farce.

[zepto]

> But they could, as iCloud Photos is not e2e

Client side scanning is a prerequsite to making it e2e if you also want countermeasures against CSAM.

[amanaplanacanal]

Has Apple said this is what they are going to do, or are people just guessing?

[zepto]

They haven’t announced this, but they invest a lot in encryption and privacy, and have stated that user privacy is a value of theirs. They have also expressed that they don’t want access to be able to be forced by law enforcement.

[sneak]

Their actions speak louder than their words.

[zepto]

And their actions show that they aren’t likely to do any of the scary things they are being accused of.

That’s the point - people keep claiming some nefarious slippery slope, which is of course in the realm of possibility, but is not actually happening.

[nojito]

No they refuse to indiscriminately scan iCloud.

[thw0rted]

Does that 30k number include iCloud Photo data? Do you have a citation for this?

[sneak]

Apple's own transparency report, under FISA orders. Presumably it includes all subscriber data they can access for the specified accounts, so likely contacts, photos, and device backups (full iMessage chat history, or sync keys to decrypt same).

FISA orders are not warrants and do not require probable cause; the FISA Amendments Act Section 702 spying that goes on (aka PRISM internally to the IC) pulls data directly from cloud provider systems without a search warrant and was cited by Ed Snowden as one of the main reasons he came forward.