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by jonathanmayer
1775 days ago
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(Context: I teach computer security at Princeton and have a paper at this week's Usenix Security Symposium describing and analyzing a protocol that is similar to Apple's: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentat....) The proposed attack on Apple's protocol doesn't work. The user's device adds randomness when generating an outer encryption key for the voucher. Even if an adversary obtains both the hash set and the blinding key, they're just in the same position as Apple—only able to decrypt if there's a hash match. The paper could do a better job explaining how the ECC blinding scheme works. |
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This is one of the concerns in the OP, have an AI generate millions of variations of a certain kind of images and check the hashes. In this case it boils down to how common false positives neural hashes are.