| Played with TC for an hour or so this evening, and what I stated above (possibly poorly) still stands.
I chose google maps in particular, because it is an application that requires telemetry data to function; but it is reasonable for an individual to not want to be tracked when not using google maps. If I block infinitedata-pa.gogleapis.com, maps will not function, but google maps will continue to collect telemetry data on my phone if it is running and has permissions. It will save that collected data until a user unblocks essential monitoring in order to use maps (Unless the user clears cache/data, or uninstalls maps, before unblocking). That is the case I am pointing out, tc is a stopgap (and a welcome/useful one) but it does _not_ provide users a way to prevent _collecting_ of telemetry data to be sent off the device. It just delays the sending until the applications use is more valuable than the users privacy. Edit: Things that could help with that: 1. Physical kill switches for radios (I know, that's not going to happen from any major arm cpu maker, the SOC is integrated, but it's the most practical solution.). 2. Granular permissions settings for androids network location provider. As an example, A permission that if app is running in the background send spoofed location data back (Once again, it's not that simple telemetry data is coming from many sources, I'm just listing what solves the problem.). |