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by TuringNYC
1778 days ago
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I'm speaking about this at a conference next week. Here is the MONEY QUOTE from Paul Weiss investigative report: >>>
...further, the various Risk Committees only had access to data that were four to six weeks old. As a consequence, Risk was unaware of, and unable to fully appreciate in real time, the magnitude and pace of the exponential growth in Archegos’s positions...
<<< Ref: https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/a... I'd like to also point out that unlike the 2008 crisis with margin calls which were highly subjective based on difficult projections of housing prices and defaults and correlations (think AIG-FP), here, these were pretty simple equity swaps. Valuing these assets is not difficult |
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"Indeed, the 'Action/Decision' for Archegos was for CRM to 'notify of any changes with the counterparty and revisit the counterparty at afuture meeting.' CPOC did not set a deadline for remediating Archegos’s limit breaches, for moving Archegos to dynamic margining with add-ons, or even for reporting back or revisiting the status of Archegos at a futuremeeting."
The Archeos situation was escalated as far up as possible, up to this CPOC committee, where the Chief Risk Officer of the Investment Bank was a member. Instead of the CRO breathing down their neck until the situation was remediated, they got away with a bullet point in some minutes, without even a set deadline.
It appears that Credit Swiss replaced their CRO though.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-29/credit-su...