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by thanksforfish 1791 days ago
Any thoughts on how customers should think about securing their skills? ChatOps exposes skills that may provide deep access to deploy code or modify system configuration. Slack doesn't have the same security as an SSH session (password protected private key). I'm seeing concerns around phone theft, evil maid, spouses, or former employees who haven't had Slack access pulled.

From my end, I think these are solvable but may require thinking about the problem differently. How are you thinking about security?

1 comments

Absolutely! We think about security on multiple levels.

For our threat model, we focus on _companies_ using Slack, Discord, and Teams, though our efforts apply to communities, etc. For the sake of this question, I'll focus on companies using Slack, but most of it applies to the others.

Even without Abbot, if someone gains access to an employee Slack account, they can do immense damage. So it's very important for companies to enforce good security on Slack such as 2-factor auth, etc. If you use Abbot, that's even more important. To interact with Abbot in chat, a user must be logged into your Slack organization. So we encourage customers to take their Slack account security seriously.

Now it may happen that a Slack account is compromised despite a company's best efforts. So the next level of protection is the ability to protect skills using Abbot's access control. You can restrict skills to a limited set of users. That makes it possible to follow the principle of least privilege and reduce exposure of the most sensitive skills.

Finally, despite our best efforts, there may be the case where someone gains access to a privileged account. Abbot logs every interaction it has with users, whether through the Bot console (in the website) or via chat. So if someone does somehow get access, you can audit what activities they took, what secrets they accessed.

It's also important to look at security from the perspective of a skill author. To create a skill, a user has to be a member of the "Members" role in https://ab.bot/. This requires that they are a member of the associated Slack organization and have logged into https://ab.bot/ with their Slack account (we don't implement our own authentication).

An Abbot Administrator can choose to let anyone in the Slack organization automatically be added to the "Members" role when they log in. That may be appropriate for smaller high-trust companies. For larger companies, administrators may want have tighter control on access to the website.

Skill authors are encouraged not to embed tokens and other secrets in the code for skills. Instead, use the secrets management built in. There's also a proxy link feature for certain cases where a secret is embedded in a URL and you don't want the secret exposed even to skill authors.

That's where we are today.

In the future, we'd like to integrate with Active Directory, LDAP, etc. for managing access to the site and skills. Also, we know that many systems people want to access are going to be behind a firewall. So we are looking into onprem options, but those may be further down the road.

If you have some ideas on where we can improve or areas we should be thinking about, we are definitely interested in hearing about it. This is very important to us.

Slack is often misconfigured - mid-sized companies without a proper IAM team/engineer often enable auto-provisioning which sends an invite to @<whitelisted domain>. If you can identify a e-mail reflection vuln on the domain you can parlay that into a Slack invite, and while ChatOps might be the least of the concerns I fear this is reinforcing bad hygiene.

Additionally companies forced to be SOX compliant require separation of duties, which is often incompatible with slash commands that impact production or revenue generating infrastructure.

For teams that are concerned about whether their Slack is configured correctly, Abbot can be put into a waitlist mode where an administrator on the Abbot team has to explicitly approve any access. No matter how Abbot is configured, all commands are still logged.

SOX compliance is a bit outside of our domain of influence; our goal is to give people the most powerful tools we can, in a way that they can run it in their environment without having to reinvent the wheel.

> If you can identify a e-mail reflection vuln on the domain you can parlay that into a Slack invite

On reread, I realize that I'm not sure I understand what sort of attack you're talking about. While I think we've done a good job of making Abbot a safe entity, could you describe how this works? It's possible there's an attack vector we haven't considered. Thanks for sharing!

You need to know the Slack workspace URL, looks like the previous method I used to find this for arbitrary domains has been fixed. Workspace URLs aren't secret, though, and can often be guessed. Let's assume finding this for your target isn't an issue.

The most common reflection attack is through support systems, specifics will vary depending on the product used. Not all are vulnerable to this.

Open a support ticket with support@company.com pretending to have a valid complaint. Obtain the unique e-mail address for your ticket such as support+2392@company.com, and use "Sign up" at https://company.slack.com/signup#/domain-signup with the support ticket e-mail address.

The support ticket system can leak the contents of the Slack invitation as a ticket update. Once you know the validation URL Slack allows you to sign up.

Great answer, thanks for the detail!