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by ajklsdhfniuwehf
1799 days ago
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for this to be true, the password to key transformation have to be extremely broken for you to be able to infer what is a valid key from what looks like fixed size random noise. well, this might be true if you use some NIST or RSA certified process :) but who cares about that other than bureaucrats who run entire cities with one set of master keys anyway. > This is rate-limited by hardware See this is the kinda of thing those bureaucrats would say. If your hdd is out of your device and i am brute forcing the key, who cares about the password to key transformation? that is already behind me. |
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You're not bruteforcing the derived key (ie. the value from the KDF), you're running a wordlist against the KDF and seeing which values work.
>If your hdd is out of your device and i am brute forcing the key, who cares about the password to key transformation? that is already behind me.
The difference is that with a TPM, you can't run a wordlist attack, since password attempts have to go through the TPM, and it throttles your guessing attempts. Without a TPM you can run the KDF as fast as you want, across as many machines as you want.