[WhyNotHugo]

Honestly, I think providing the disk decryption password during early boot is a lot safer.

If the TPM yields the decryption key, then the disk is mounted without the user being present, so any RUNTIME security hole can be exploited by the attacker (e.g.: USB exploits, etc).

The Mac/Windows model just seems less-safe (though more friendly for shared devices).

I would like a shared system though: where I provide half the key, and the TPM has the other half, so BOTH are necessary to decrypt the disk.

[michaelt]

Just keying in the password at boot is indeed more secure than using a TPM, when it comes to the threat of someone snatching your powered-off laptop.

But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts, you might feel the middling security a TPM provides is an improvement over not encrypting the disk at all.

Or if you issue a big fleet of laptops to forgetful users, and remote password reset is a must-have feature, the TPM is more secure than the user writing the password on a post-it note stuck to the laptop.

Or if you're making something like a TiVo where you want it to work without a password - while also locking down the device, even against the owner.

So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation!

[nuker]

> But if you want full disk encryption for a server without the need to attend it in person to enter the password every time it restarts … So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation!

Also great for personal NAS for example. But its bloody hard to implement on Linux/BSD at the moment

[WhyNotHugo]

> So TPMs are great if you're a big corporation!

Quite true. They're pretty bad if you're just a person.

[invokestatic]

Windows supports TPM+PIN which is what you describe.