[mnowicki]

Is it reasonable to say the universe might be superdeterministic, but in the example of choosing measurements for an experiment(or almost any other example imaginable), it might as well be truly random as the causal links affecting the instruments isn't likely to be 'conspiring' in some way to impact the results of the experiment?

e.g Anything could be predicted with absolute knowledge of the starting state of the universe, and infinite computing power, but in most practical cases the causal connections between seemingly unrelated objects is irrelevant and as good as random?

[sebzim4500]

I think it stops being science at that point though. For example, if someone made a quantum computer powerful enough to factorise large numbers then that would appear to disprove superdeterminism. However, proponents could always argue that the computer only works because the universe conspires to make the human entering in the numbers to be factorized enter specific values which the computer will then know the factors of.

I'm not a physicist though, so I might have something wrong here.