| There are so many things wrong with this comment I do not know where to begin. "The list is already public" is the understatement of the year. If the list was not public it would be impossible for clients to build a circuit. "There are many mirrors of it" is the runner up for understatement of the year. Every running instance of tor has the capability to publish the list of exit nodes. I am not going to pretend to understand anonymous mixes as well as arma, Nick and Paul and I would like to suggest that you do the same. The designers of tor did not make it "technically impossible to hide an exit node to help mitigate the potential for abuse." It is "technically impossible to hide the exit node list" because without the list clients would not be able to build functioning circuits. But don't take my word for it: "We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see." [1] Two of the other sides of tptacek's 50 sided die are censorship resistance and abuse resistance. Anonymity is hard enough as it is. Do everyone a favor and refrain from telling us what arma, nick and paul intended... [1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#You.... |