Ok - please forgive/correct/help me out here if I’ve got the sticky end of the stick, but both the premise and conclusion, very clumsily put, seem to me to be: ‘formal or classical systems of logic are more limited/not as rigorous/less useful/less challenging than some people believe them to be, especially when applied to
Aristotelean/Thomist philosophy/conceptions, because of their ‘merely’ relational syntax/nature and because they cannot adequately express/encapsulate concepts/‘things’ that the author holds to be true or self-evident features of his perceived reality/received wisdom/everyday utility/a priori metaphysics. The author concedes its usefulness in certain contexts: particularly when combined/in conjunction with his favoured philosophical ideas, or used in support of them, but that it does not present a challenge/undermine the author’s ideas/beliefs in ways that presumably some prior/present critics might suggest.’