[FeepingCreature]

If "my" house is actually a meeting place for half the country, or even just half the city, and I've decided almost anyone can paint on the walls, I should not be able to say that one specific person cannot paint on the walls because, for instance, I don't like what party they vote for. Any restriction on wallpainting in that space must be independent of the content of the message. If I wanted to limit that message, I should have to go through the proper democratic circles, ie. pass a city ordnance.

This is the same logic that prevents me from saying that in this meeting hall, gay people are not allowed entry.

[thegrimmest]

I disagree wholeheartedly. If your front yard happens to become a popular meeting space for the town, it doesn't change your rights to your yard. You can still ask anyone to leave for any reason. Google literally built all their infrastructure from the ground-up. It's theirs in the most direct sense of the word, and we should take an attitude of humble gratitude for their ongoing contributions to our wellbeing, rather then continue our attempts to punish them for their success.

[FeepingCreature]

If you permit your front yard to become a popular meeting space for the town, I think it does change your rights to your yard.

Ownership implies responsibility.

[thegrimmest]

No, ownership is a fixed contract specifying property rights. It's tyrannical to change this contract without the consent of the rights holder.

[mjthompson]

I don't think I need to respond - you've encapsulated what I would have said perfectly.

[joshuamorton]

You've conflated a few things here. Are we banning people or messages? You've said that bans need to be content neutral, but also that they can't be based on the individual doing the painting. This would mean that, for example porn would need to be acceptable. Or advertisements, but it seems reasonable for the owner to ban both of those things in pursuit of their desired aesthetic.

The actual case seems to be that anyone can paint anything except certain banned things. But any person can still paint other unbanned things.

That's different than banning particular people. In other words, if the republicans are allowed to discuss everything except vaccine conspiracies, you aren't discriminating against republicans, so this analogy about banning individuals doesn't work. And of course you might ban a particular individual from the premises for repeatedly breaking those rules.

All of this seems perfectly reasonable, and indeed I know real-world spaces that operate more or less like this.

[FeepingCreature]

> This would mean that, for example porn would need to be acceptable. Or advertisements, but it seems reasonable for the owner to ban both of those things in pursuit of their desired aesthetic.

Yes, I stand by this. If it's legal to have porn on your house wall, it should be legal for people to paint porn on your communal wall.

Again, the solution to this should be a city ordnance. The problem to me is not restrictions but accountability.

> The actual case seems to be that anyone can paint anything except certain banned things. But any person can still paint other unbanned things.

This seems akin to saying that the theocracy does not discriminate against gay men, because they can marry women just like hetero men can.

[joshuamorton]

> Yes, I stand by this. If it's legal to have porn on your house wall, it should be legal for people to paint porn on your communal wall

Why? Why is it that if I allow people to paint things, I lose the right to moderate those things? Like it's still my property, right? What causes me to forfeit my property rights?

Or to ask a perhaps different question, could I close the venue entirely?

What if I later reopened it with a list of allowed people and you could only enter if you were on the list? Do I still forfeit those rights? How big does the list have to be for it to be suitably public again?

> This seems akin to saying that the theocracy does not discriminate against gay men, because they can marry women just like hetero men can.

You're going to have to explain this better. Because in practice banning gay men from marrying men prevents them from getting married at all. Preventing anyone from painting porn doesn't prevent an artist from painting not-porn. I might be more willing to agree if, for example, it was the government blanket banning porn. But we're not talking about that, were talking about one dude with one popular artists venue banning pornographic art being painted. It's not different than if I disallowed the sale of pornography in my art gallery.

Keep in mind, today, in the united states no priest is compelled to officiate a same sex wedding. The state recognizes them, but you or I don't have to.

[FeepingCreature]

> Why? Why is it that if I allow people to paint things, I lose the right to moderate those things? Like it's still my property, right? What causes me to forfeit my property rights?

Good question! In my view, the deciding factor is "universality". I think there is a fundamental difference in nature between a friendgroup and a customer base. When you offer a service to your friends, you may pick and choose how you like on any basis. When you offer a service to the general public, you are in a sense attempting to provide a "plug-in" service to society as a whole, and so the terms of that service should be negotiated with society as a whole, including such things as civil rights. This is exactly where you cross the boundary between being "a private citizen" and " part of the state".

> Or to ask a perhaps different question, could I close the venue entirely?

Yes. Nobody can be compelled to offer a service.

> What if I later reopened it with a list of allowed people and you could only enter if you were on the list? Do I still forfeit those rights? How big does the list have to be for it to be suitably public again?

I think this is a sliding scale. The specific cutoff would always be kind of arbitrary.

> > This seems akin to saying that the theocracy does not discriminate against gay men, because they can marry women just like hetero men can.

> You're going to have to explain this better. Because in practice banning gay men from marrying men prevents them from getting married at all.

No it does not; it merely prevents them from getting married in the way that they like, which is a different way than the societal norm. The right to hetero marriage, as practiced in theocratic societies, inherently normalizes hetero relations and excludes gay relations. However, there is nothing inherently wrong - in the erroneous sense, not the moral sense! - about such a choice. This demonstrates that the constraints you apply to a service, even if they only pertain to the nature of the service and not the persons the service is extended to, can still be discriminatory.

> Keep in mind, today, in the united states no priest is compelled to officiate a same sex wedding.

Likewise, inasmuch as weddings have societal relevance, I think they should be compelled to - or else not officiate any weddings at all.

[joshuamorton]

> When you offer a service to the general public, you are in a sense attempting to provide a "plug-in" service to society as a whole, and so the terms of that service should be negotiated with society as a whole, including such things as civil rights.

Does this apply to all businesses that offer services? Keep in mind here that the first amendment, in addition to protecting our right to speech, protects our right to association. That is, our right to associate with the people, and only the people, we want to is a civil right that our constitution protects just as much as speech.

If I open a store and let people purchase things, I'm offering a service to the general public. But I'm certainly not "part of the state". One of the primary concerns about the state is that it (usually) has a monopoly on the things that it does, so that if it provides a service, it's the only provider of that service.

But "speech" isn't a service that one can monopolize. Preventing speech can be done via force, but "facilitating speech" isn't monopolizable. If someone won't let you do it, you can do it yourself or find it somewhere else.

> Yes. Nobody can be compelled to offer a service.

But you are compelling me to offer a service! I want to offer the service to paint anything except X. And you say no no! You are additionally compelled to offer the service to paint X. This by the way, gets far more complicated if, for example, my service is...baking cakes. If I offer a universal cake baking service, when can I refuse to bake a cake? Can I refuse all wedding cakes? Can I refuse all cakes above a certain size? Can I refuse all cakes in red? Can I only bake chocolate cakes? Can I refuse to bake cakes for people who have previously given me bad reviews?

> No it does not; it merely prevents them from getting married in the way that they like, which is a different way than the societal norm.

So let's make this concrete. Let's say I ban painting my name. I don't want people to paint it in my house. People can paint anything else, but not my name.

With the marriage example, we generally assume that people are attracted to a particular gender, and aren't really able to change that. Are you suggesting that, similarly, there are people who cannot find happiness without painting my name on my wall?

I mean if that's the case, why is it moral for me to ban them as long as I ban everyone else too? These particular people can't be happy either way.

With marriage, the issue is that you're essentially preventing some group from being able to openly mutually associate in the way that they want to. We can quibble on exactly how much of a freedom to associate or a human right that is, but it sure sounds like a lot more of one than your ability to write my name on my wall.

There's another argument by the way, which is that marriage is a service provided to two individuals, and that providing only heterosexual marriages discriminates based on attributes of those individuals, in exactly the same way as only marrying white people would be discriminatory. This same argument doesn't work for the example of banning speech.

[FeepingCreature]

Yes, I don't believe in an unrestricted right of business association.

(Neither does the US, when it comes to discrimination on protected categories.)

> If I open a store and let people purchase things, I'm offering a service to the general public. But I'm certainly not "part of the state". One of the primary concerns about the state is that it (usually) has a monopoly on the things that it does, so that if it provides a service, it's the only provider of that service.

> But "speech" isn't a service that one can monopolize. Preventing speech can be done via force, but "facilitating speech" isn't monopolizable.

Sure it is, by controlling the platform. In any case, I have a much more expansive view of monopoly as a spectrum. Network effects, for instance, can also contribute to a monopolizing service. In any case, I believe the primary reason why monopoly is a moral risk is because a monopoly prevents you from switching providers to escape a restrictive corporate environment. My approach is instead to outlaw restrictive corporate environments.

> > Yes. Nobody can be compelled to offer a service.

> But you are compelling me to offer a service!

No, you always have the choice to not offer the service at all. I am not compelling you to offer any specific service, I am preventing you from offering a service with certain restrictive parameters.

> And you say no no! You are additionally compelled to offer the service to paint X.

No, you are compelled to offer the service to paint X, contingent on your decision to offer the service at all. You always have the option to cease offering the service entirely. And you could, I guess, close your company whenever someone requests a service you don't like. However considering fees, that may be impractical.

> I mean if that's the case, why is it moral for me to ban them as long as I ban everyone else too? These particular people can't be happy either way.

I don't have an opinion on the morality of the matter. Or rather, I don't think my morality should affect the decision. That's why I have focused this conversation specifically on the mechanism by which the morality is arbitrated, which should be the same mechanism by which state decisions are arbitrated, ie. civil rights, representative democracy etc, inasmuch as the service is of the class of "service offering to the general public" shared with some state services.