That may or may not help. If a company has a choice between going out of business or some probability of the CIO going to jail you know what they're going to choose.
But the choice is really between a personal risk of going to jail or a personal risk of finding a new job. As long as the individual risk outweighs the collective reward the incentive to lie should be small.
Besides, unless 2 or 3 execs can also implement the recovery procedure without any of their engineers catching wind I don't think it's likely that the secret would remain well kept.
The CIO can resign instead of going to jail. It all depends on how strictly the law gets e forced. If only a few get caught, then it becomes a dishonor to not have "the balls" of just risking it, and you'd not get a new job as CIO if you didn't want to play it out. But if it's guaranteed to get caught, nobody would do it.
> The CIO can resign instead of going to jail. It all depends on how strictly the law gets e forced. If only a few get caught, then it becomes a dishonor to not have "the balls" of just risking it, and you'd not get a new job as CIO if you didn't want to play it out. But if it's guaranteed to get caught, nobody would do it.
Right. Humans don't strictly adjust their behavior according to the game theoretic adjusted risk (penalty × probability). Raising the odds of getting caught tends to work much better than increasing the penalty.
That said, one of the outgrowths from this observation has been Broken Window Theory (that credits a drop in larger crimes to increasing enforcement and speedy mitigation of other - highly visible - minor infractions), which turns out to be more of a just-so story. You mostly have to increase the odds of getting caught for the crimes you are most interested in deterring rather than something else.
Besides, unless 2 or 3 execs can also implement the recovery procedure without any of their engineers catching wind I don't think it's likely that the secret would remain well kept.