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by tptacek
1804 days ago
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Take any list of the top domains on the Internet --- any of them at all --- and run them through a trivial script, like: #!/bin/sh
while read domain
do
ds=$(dig ds $domain +short)
echo "$domain $ds"
done
... and note that virtually none of the domains, in any sane list of top domains, are signed. That was true several years ago and remains true today, despite the supposed "increase in usage" of DNSSEC.What's actually changed is that registrars, especially in Europe, now apparently auto-sign domain names. That creates a constant stream of new, more-or-less ephemeral signed zones that gives the appearance of increasing DNSSEC adoption. Of course, this is also security theater (the owners of the zones don't own their keys!). The real figure of merit for DNSSEC adoption is adoption by sites of significance, and that has been static, and practically nonexistent, for a decade. It is no surprise to me that people working on the DNS talk quite a bit about DNSSEC. People who worked on SNMP talked quite a bit about SNMPv3, and IPSEC people probably really believed there would be Internet-wide IKE. None of those things happened, because what matters in the real world is what the market decides. Most especially at the companies with serious security teams, DNSSEC is a dead letter standard. |
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In fact, the new CDS and CDNSKEY DNS records allow it to work the other way around; DNS server operators can auto-sign domains, and the registrars need not be involved at all.
> The real figure of merit for DNSSEC adoption is adoption by sites of significance
People said the same about IPv6. Or maybe you do, too?
> People who worked on SNMP talked quite a bit about SNMPv3
I seem to recall you mentioning quite often how WHOIS was dead and would be replaced by RDAP. That didn’t happen either.
> IPSEC people probably really believed there would be Internet-wide IKE
Interestingly, that problem could in theory be solved by DNSSEC. We’ll see what happens.