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In Orthodox Judaism, the letter of the law typically is the spirit of the law. Not a perfect analogy, but think of the talmud as similar to the tax code. There are things that are black, things that are white and things that are gray. If the tax code said there's a 5% sales tax on tangerines, clementines, navel oranges, lemons, and grapefruit, I'm probably not gonna volunteer to pay taxes on my Sumo Citruses, because it's not explicitly in there. Perhaps doing so would be in the spirit of the law, but that's just not the way people think when it comes to taxes. Same thing in Judaism... if it's technically legal, you can do it (this stems from the notion that the Jewish legal rules are of divine origin, and so if something was excluded, then its absence is intentional)[1]. Of course, much like the tax code, there are gray areas where different accountants (rabbis) may interpret the rules differently. One place where the analogy diverges is that in Judaism, there are lots of areas where the earlier generations of rabbis acknowledge something to be technically allowed according to the divine rules, but they forbid it anyway, either because they felt there was some societal benefit to doing so, or because they felt that adding an additional prohibition would prevent people from accidentally breaking the divine rule [1]. [1] Of course, the analogy breaks down, because it's more complicated than this. There are plenty of areas where people are customarily stricter, even if something is ok by the letter of the law. This applies to Sabbath Mode on elevators, which many Orthodox Jews won't use, but won't necessarily say that it's prohibited. [2] An example of this is the prohibition of eating milk and meat in the same dish. Technically, the divine rule is no cooking milk and meat together, but the rabbis added an extra rule of no eating them together to make sure that people wouldn't come to cook them together. |
I would like to understand the reasoning behind the belief that even legal rules of divine origin would include mention of things human culture would have had no concept of, and human language no word for, in the time the rule was made — such that the rules would be "complete for all future time" rather than "those relevant as of the time of covenant."
Wouldn't even a god think it more optimal to hold off on telling us rules about e.g. which synthetic meats are kosher, until we invent such things?
It seems awfully suspicious to the validity of that interpretation, that there are plenty of specific/concrete prohibitions given amongst divine rulings, but of those, none are about things that were entirely mysterious at the time, written down "as spoken" without understanding, only able to be made sense of centuries/millennia later.
In fact — the Hebrew god is an intercessor god, not an absent god; don't they already "amend" their own previous rules whenever they communicate specific orders / demands / requirements to particular people? Does that not, by itself, disrupt the interpretation of the initial set of laws given being a perfect closed set, never to be updated, applicable to all future circumstances? Would a perfect body of divine law not already imply those orders / demands / requirements, such that there would be no need for further communication?