[bumby]

>I don’t think it’s a great example of using existential threat for sales, when the whole thing was sold as a cost saving.

Again, if there is no threat (perceived or real), there is no need for a weapons system, period. Think of it this way, if there was a proposal for a cost savings for an anti-spacecraft/anti-asteroid system mounted to the JWST? I'm saying no, because there is no credible threat that would prevent. You need the threat first, in order for the cost savings of a program to have meaning if the basis of the program is threat mitigation.

>Pretty much everyone at the time just wanted more F-22s

Not really, unless you're only talking about a specific branch. Only the Air Force wanted F22s. As was stated by another commenter, the JSF was needed because it was because it fulfilled desires that other services had that the F22 does not provide.

[abz10]

Threat mitigation is largely nuclear shield; but if you’re taking about maintaining air superiority then the F-22 is where it is at. The Navy carrier fleets and Marines are force projection.

The JSF were sold around cost savings; half the price so you could buy twice as many.

[bumby]

I think you're taking a very narrow definition of what a threat means to make your point. To a Marine in Afghanistan, the threat was not mitigated by a nuclear arsenal. To them, close air support from a technologically inferior aircraft like the A10 did a better job of eliminating a threat than the F22 in many instances. To the original point, this is why it became difficult to retire the old plane despite the JSF and F22. It could be tied to a specific threat, and that meant it was politically much easier to defend keeping it around even if the business case was that it costs too much money. At the end of the day, politically defending a budget is much easier if it can be concretely tied to a credible risk.