[tmearnest]

Dates and times are generally deidentified by choosing a random initial date and changing subsequent timestamps to the random initial plus the duration between visits. The sequence and delays could potentially be used to identify patients, but this would be a lot harder than having absolute timestamps.

[specialist]

Totally.

I recently had a crazy notion for losslessly scrambling the sequence as well. Mostly for protecting voter privacy (order in which ballots are cast). One of the major blockers to fully digital voting.

I haven't found any hits using terms like "cryptographic timestamps." Surely I can't be the first.

[seoaeu]

Voter privacy for digital voting doesn't solve much. It doesn't seem to be possible to both cryptographically prove to a voter that their vote was counted correctly (integrity) while simultaneously preventing them from being at risk of coercion to share who they voted for (privacy).

[specialist]

Totally. I remain 100% opposed. "Cryptographic timestamps" would only solve one of the many blockers.

Sadly, others will continue to push their harebrained ideas.

One thing I learned as an activist is that offense beats defense. Meaning it's easier to promote a correct solution than oppose all the bad solutions.

So if a digital equivalent of the Australian Ballot system (private voting, public counting) exists, I better find it.