| > Approval voting I think is much too tactical and, strictly speaking, worse than IRV. On the contrary, approval voting gets better results than IRV with any measure of strategic or honest voters. See extensive computer simulation results by Harvard stats PhD and voting methods expert Jameson Quinn. Brown (50/50) is probably the most realistic setting. https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/VSE5key A simple example of IRV strategy is next year's Alaska senate race. Murkowski would beat either rival head-to-head but is likely to be eliminated based on first-place votes. So Democrats want to strategically rank Murkowski 1st in order to help her survive to beat Tshibaka (Trump Republican) so they at least get their lesser evil. Here's a good comparison of approval voting vs. IRV by experts. Full disclosure, I was a CES co-founder and have written extensively on this topic for 15 years. https://electionscience.org/library/approval-voting-versus-i... > I honestly thought that after learning Arrow’s impossibility theorem that Condorcet is not especially important. I've visited Kenneth Arrow at his home and co-founded a non-profit that interviewed him. His theorem only applies to social welfare functions, not voting methods, if properly understood. But if anything, the moral is to AVOID ranked voting methods and instead use rated voting methods. https://www.rangevoting.org/ArrowThm |