[whatshisface]

>Killing something, once you know what and where it is, is not a problem most militaries have.

It would be if there was a real war with a lot of things at once. That statement is only true for peacetime "executive action" wars with a 100:1 force ratio. It is an auxiliary role that has little to do with how things would go if there was a war between somewhat equal powers.

The lessons of enforcing foreign policy on ten people who live in a country with neutral diplomatic status will probably not apply if you change the number ten or the neutral diplomatic status.

[ethbr0]

Debatable. Armament stocks are ridiculously large, relative to value targets.

Which makes sense, because cruise missiles cost less than radar systems.

And I question whether "build one more drone" is an economically superior answer vs "build one more smart bomb."

[Arrath]

There are never enough bombs to go around, especially smarter versions. Classic every problem is a nail and I have a hammer situation for commanders and strike planners once they have access to such munitions.

This bit NATO forces in Libya[1], for example.

Building drones may well be more scalable and economically viable than smart bombs. Consider a multiuse drone that could be utilized for battlefield recon with its camera, or the user snaps something akin to a BLU-108[2] smart munition onto the bottom of the chassis and now they have a remote controlled smart anti-tank weapon. The drone being multi use could increase the use cases, increasing the order size, decreasing the unit cost.

[1]https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some...

[2]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BLU-108

[ethbr0]

From [1], it seems like the European stocks are a compatibility issue (can't mount US munitions) and a funding issue (don't purchase and store enough for a sustained campaign).

> Building drones may well be more scalable and economically viable than smart bombs

That's the heart of the matter. Is it, or isn't it? And for what? The commentary usually glosses over this.

E.g. what's the difference between a JSOW-ER deploying CBU-103s / BLU-108s or a "drone"?

I think the more important future distinctions are going to be between attritable/simple vs expensive/capable platforms, temporary vs persistent platforms, and organic autonomy vs network-reliant. Where some combination of the qualities is optimal for any particular mission.

As an example: Is a mid-air refuelable X-61 without organic sensors but carrying smart munitions a cruise missile or a drone?

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynetics_X-61_Gremlins

[Arrath]

> E.g. what's the difference between a JSOW-ER deploying CBU-103s / BLU-108s or a "drone"?

For those on the receiving end, I can't imagine its anything more than an academic distinction.

For the forces using such items, it could come down to doctrine, or funding fights. It could be that lawmakers approving budgets will find it more palatable to approve a big purchase of 'drones' instead of 'smart cluster munitions'.

I expect we'll see a profusion of new devices marketed as either, or both, depending on the use case and the audience. It may be that the definition will never really be nailed down.

> I think the more important future distinctions are going to be between attritable/simple vs expensive/capable platforms, temporary vs persistent platforms, and organic autonomy vs network-reliant. Where some combination of the qualities is optimal for any particular mission.

I absolutely agree.

[whatshisface]

Weapons caches are valuable targets, so unless all the world's major powers are keeping all of their missiles in a number of locations much smaller than the number of missiles their opponents have, I don't see how armament stocks can be large compared to the number of targets. That's even assuming that the only targets will be military targets, which wasn't even true in WWII.