[encryptluks2]

First, saying it might as well be virtual is a bit of a misnomer. There are various options, and although they may act like a VM they are significantly faster than machine-based VMs like QEMU:

https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/policy/pod-security-poli...

> As of Kubernetes v1.19, you can use the seccompProfile field in the securityContext of Pods or containers to control use of seccomp profiles.

If you're looking for a more general abstraction, there is gVisor and others as well.

[kasey_junk]

Again, not an expert but security policies aren't immune from container breakouts right?

Which leaves you to either use something like firecracker or gvisor which are either virtualization solutions or the next closest thing in that they intermediate all of your syscalls?

[encryptluks2]

Almost all container breakout concerns rely on running containers as a privileged user:

https://stackoverflow.com/questions/53024790/kubernetes-supp...

There is an issue that I've been tracking, and there has been a new PR that will hopefully land soon to implement this in Kubernetes in a simplified manner:

https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/127

As for whether security policies prevent breakouts, it really depends on what the exploit is but they can significantly help. The idea of user namespace remapping solves a secondary issue though... if there is a breakout, what user privileges will they have.